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Understanding the potential link between environmental regulations and economic 
activities is crucial to both the regulated industries and policy makers. This 
dissertation explores three key questions in order to understand environmental 
regulations and their impacts. 1) How to measure enviro mental regulatory burden? 
2) What are the impacts of environmental regulations  competitiveness? 3) What 
are the determinants of regulatory stringency?  
The theory of the Pollution Haven Effect (PHE) predicts that tightening up 
environmental regulations will affect regulated industries’ competitiveness and trade 
flows. In the first part of this dissertation, I construct a measure from pollution 
abatement costs (PAC) to quantify the changes in regulatory stringency and 
empirically test PHE while controlling for firm dynamics and industry composition. 
Previous studies have used PAC as a measure for environmental regulations. I build a 
theory model to show that regulation-induced changes in abatement costs contain an 
extensive margin (i.e. cost change due to changes in industry composition) in addition 
 
 
to the intensive margin (i.e. cost change for a fixed set of firms). Results from 
decomposition analysis confirm that, compared to the intensive margin, overall 
changes in PAC underestimate changes in regulatory s ringency and may further lead 
to overestimated PHE. I then use the two margins as separate explanatory variables to 
explain the US’s net imports from Canada, Mexico and the rest of the world. 
Estimation results indicate that PHE driven by the int nsive margin is smaller than 
that estimated previously, which corrects the overestimation of using overall 
abatement costs. 
The second part of this dissertation empirically explores the determinants of 
regulatory stringency in the context of the US water pollution regulations. I argue that 
state regulators use facilities’ compliance performance to infer their abatement efforts 
and technology in order to implement the technology-based and water quality-based 
control of the National Pollutant Discharge Eliminat on System (NPDES) permits. 
Results from econometric analyses confirm that regulators make permitting decisions 
based on information inferred from compliance history as well as that discovered 
during inspection activities. Self-disclosed violations are regarded as a signal for 
cooperation (i.e. adequate abatement effort under technology constraint) and will be 
rewarded with relaxed future permits. Non-cooperating behaviors, such as absent 
monitoring reports, improper operation and maintenance as detected during 
inspections and violations that lead to high penalties will likely result in more 
stringent future limit. In addition, regulators will also modify the limit levels in 
response to local water quality. Taken together, these results indicate that the 
 
 
regulators aim to ensure a certain water quality standard by inducing higher 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Environmental regulations aim to protect environmental quality and solve problems 
rising in the relationship between the environment and the economy. Environmental 
consequences of industrial and residential activities (e.g. pollution) are classic 
examples of negative externality where the costs are bo ne by the entire society. The 
fundamental theoretical foundation of environmental regulations lies in providing 
incentives for the economic agents to internalize the externality. In the US, 
environmental regulations cover almost all aspects of unintended environmental 
consequences, including reducing air and water polluti n, controlling toxic releases, 
and conservation of natural resources, to name a few (US EPA, 2012a).  
One major concern of environmental regulations is that hey may impose significant 
costs on the regulated firms and industries and harm their competitiveness in the 
domestic and global markets (Becker, 2005; Jaffe et al., 1995). For example, 
economic analyses on the impacts of environmental regulations suggest that 
regulations may slow employment, investment and prouctivity (Greenstone, 2002).  
These negative effects may further create an incentive for plants to strategically 
choose their locations across states and even relocat  to developing countries with lax 
environmental regulations (Becker & Henderson, 2000; Ederington et al., 2005; Gray 
& Shadbegian, 2002) . It is crucial to understand whether or to what extent 
environmental regulations have undermined the competitiveness of the regulated 
industries in order to inform the scope and stringency of the regulations. Despite a 
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sizable literature in the past decade, the direction and magnitude of environmental 
regulations’ impacts on competitiveness have remained a debatable empirical 
question. The first objective of this dissertation s to provide empirical evidence for 
the hypothesis of the “Pollution Haven Effect” (PHE) (Copeland & Taylor, 2004), or 
the impacts of environmental regulations on internatio l competitiveness. 
In order to correctly quantify the economic impacts, a crucial first step is to find an 
appropriate measure for changes in environmental regulatory stringency. Economists 
have been using the pollution abatement cost (PAC) as a proxy for regulatory 
stringency (e.g. Morgenstern, Pizer, & Shih, 1998). PAC involves the cost of 
purchasing, installing and operating equipment in order to prevent and reduce the 
level of pollution (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). This measure is desirable for a 
number of reasons. First of all, PAC provides a comparable and consistent measure of 
regulatory stringency so that we can compare regulations across different industries 
and countries and over time. Secondly, PAC provides a quantitative and continuous 
measure which is able to capture the phase-in of many regulation programs. Finally, 
PAC captures the effect of enforcement and compliance of regulations. Stringency of 
a regulation depends on how much it is enforced, which is the actual burden on the 
regulated parties. The PAC measure is widely used by economists trying to quantify 
the economic impacts of environmental regulations (e.g. Ederington et al., 2005; 
Levinson & Taylor, 2008). In this dissertation, I examine whether PAC is an 
appropriate measure to evaluate the competitiveness implications of environmental 
regulations. Under the circumstances of firm-heterog neity and industry composition 
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change, aggregate PAC may fail to fully capture the c ange in environmental 
regulatory stringency. 
Observing increasing abatement costs and potential loss of competitiveness, a natural 
question to ask is what should be the optimal level of regulation and what factors 
drive the change of regulatory stringency. For a command and control system, 
theoretical models show that the optimal regulatory st ategy should be one that 
minimizes social costs given the regulated firms mini ze private costs (Cohen, 
1999). Despite a great deal of theoretical endeavor, little empirical evidence exists on 
the determinants of regulatory stringency. A final objective of this dissertation is to 
explore the question of environmental standard setting and to provide empirical 
evidence in the context of the water pollution regulations in the US. 
To address the abovementioned issues, the remainder of this dissertation is organized 
as follows. In Chapter 2, I explore: 1) how to measure environmental regulations? 
and 2) what are the impacts of environmental regulations on international trade 
flows, or PHE? To answer the first question, I build a simple theory model to show 
that regulation-induced changes in abatement costs ntain an extensive margin (cost 
change due to changes in industry composition) in addition to the intensive margin 
(cost increase for a fixed set of firms). Using abatement cost data from the US 
manufacturing industry, I perform a decomposition analysis to empirically identify 
these intensive margins, which more accurately represent the effects of regulation 
changes on abatement costs. The overall change in th aggregate abatement cost is 
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shown to under-measure the change in regulatory stringency. To explore the second 
question of the empirical validity of PHE, I use th intensive and extensive margins 
as separate explanatory variables to explain the US’s net imports from Canada, 
Mexico and the rest of the world. Estimation results indicate that PHE driven by the 
intensive margin is smaller than previously estimated. This demonstrates that using 
the intensive margin corrects the overestimation of PHE as in previous studies. 
In Chapter 3, I explore the determinants of regulatory stringency in the context of the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under 
the Clean Water Act (CWA). I propose that the regulatory standards are determined 
by regulators’ perception of plants’ abatement effort and technology inferred from 
the past performance. Using data from the US chemical manufacturing industry, I 
find that the regulators (permitting authorities) are trying to decide an optimal limit to 
induce the highest effort under the capacity of best available technology. They 
further use past environmental performance, including ifferent types of violations 
and enforcement actions, together with findings from inspection activities to infer the 
level of effort and technology capacity. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the 
NPDES program is to protect local water quality. The permitting decisions will 
therefore depend on the water-quality based control when the technology-based 
control is not sufficient to protect a water body for its designated use.  
Finally I summarize the findings of this dissertation and discuss contributions and 
policy implications in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2:  Firm heterogeneity, industry composition change 
and the Pollution Haven Effect  
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding the potential link between environmental regulations and economic 
activities is crucial to both the regulated industries and policy makers. There are 
concerns that stringent environmental regulations may i pose significant costs and 
harm the regulated industries’ competitiveness in the global market (e.g. Jaffe et al., 
1995). The theory of “Pollution Haven Effect” (PHE) predicts that “tightening up of 
pollution regulation will, at the margin, have an effect on plant location decisions 
and trade flows”(Copeland & Taylor, 2004). The direction and magnitude of PHE 
remains an important empirical question. Previous st dies that aim to empirically 
assess PHE have generated mixed results (Ederington et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 1995; 
Levinson & Taylor, 2008). Notably, most of these studies have been using the 
pollution abatement cost (PAC) as a measure for regulatory stringency of 
environmental policies. However, industry-level PAC may fail to capture the full 
effect of regulation changes due to firm-heterogeneity and changes in the industry 
structure. In fact, various empirical papers as well as theoretical models have 
documented that firms are differentiated and may respond differently to changes in 
regulations (Heyes, 2009; Millimet et al., 2009). Environmental regulations may, 
among others, favor firms of different sizes, change entry conditions, and affect 
market competition. Industry level compliance costs may thus fail to fully capture the 
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change in regulatory stringency because the composition of the manufacturing 
industry has changed.  
My research aims to explore theoretically and empirically the effect of environmental 
regulations represented by PAC on international trade flows, controlling for the 
presence of firm-heterogeneity in abatement abilities and changes in the industry 
structure. To understand changes in environmental regulations, I setup a 
heterogeneous firm model which shows that regulation-induced changes in industry-
level abatement costs contain two components: an inte sive margin (cost change for a 
fixed set of firms) and an extensive margin (cost change due to changes in industry 
composition led by firm entry and exit as well as expansion and shrinkage of existing 
firms). I further use decomposition analysis to empirically identify these intensive 
margin effects, which more accurately represent the effects of regulation changes on 
abatement costs, from the extensive margins.  
Using the abatement cost and output data from the US manufacturing sector at 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level for the period from 1977 to 1986, I 
show that the intensive margin effects differ substantially from the aggregated 
changes in PAC. These results indicate that aggregating industry-level PAC likely 
underestimates the full effects of changes in regulatory stringency of environmental 
policies. The impacts of environment regulations on trade flows are therefore 
overestimated when the undervalued regulation change is used as the explanatory 
variable in testing PHE. 
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To re-examine PHE, I use the intensive and extensiv margins of abatement costs as 
separate explanatory variables to explain changes in the US’s net imports from 
Canada, Mexico and the rest of the world. Results from fixed effects estimations 
suggest that abatement cost change at the intensive margin and the extensive margin 
may lead to different or even opposite PHE. Specifically, the intensive margin has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on net imports, which supports the PHE 
hypothesis. As the composition change is controlled for by including the extensive 
margin, the magnitude of PHE driven by the intensive margin is smaller than 
previously estimated, which corrects the overestimation as in previous studies. To the 
best of my knowledge, this study is the first to systematically study the effects of 
environmental regulations on trade flows while contr lling for changes in industry 
structure. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous 
work on the economic impacts of environmental regulations, and explains why 
changes in industry structure may cause PAC to be an inaccurate measure of 
regulatory stringency. Section 2.3 describes a theoretical framework to show the 
existence and magnitude of the intensive and extensiv  margins of PAC. Section 2.4 
presents empirical evidence from decomposition analysis using the industry level 
data. I separate the intensive and extensive margins to empirically estimate PHE in 
Section 2.5 and conclude in Section 2.6. 
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2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. The Pollution Haven Effect 
In addition to rising compliance cost, tightening up regulations may also lead to, 
among others, loss of employment, capital stock and final output (Greenstone, 2002). 
Firms may relocate to countries or regions with lax regulations to avoid extra costs 
associated with such regulations. Those unable to move may suffer from a 
competitive disadvantage compared with their global competitors. In either case we 
may expect to observe an increase in trade flows from the less regulated places to the 
more regulated regions (Copeland & Taylor, 2004).   
Pollution abatement expenditure per unit of output has been widely used as a measure 
of regulatory stringency in PHE literature (see for example Ederington & Minier, 
2003; Levinson & Taylor, 2008). The main reason for this popularity is due to the 
difficulty to compare regulatory stringency using specific constraints given various 
environmental standards that different firms and industries have to meet. The 
abatement cost provides a comprehensive and comparable measure of regulatory 
stringency across firms and industries.  In addition, the abatement cost captures not 
only changes in regulations per se but also the sevrity of enforcement of the 
regulations, as well as legal and political battles (Joshi et al., 2001). After all, the 
stringency of regulations is determined by the extent to which they are actually 
enforced. In addition, the abatement cost as a quantitative and continuous measure 
also captures the phase-in of many regulations over tim  and provides ease in 
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conducting statistical analyses. 
To date, there is a sizable literature that empirically examines the existence and 
magnitude of PHE by testing the impact of regulations n international trade flows. 
Copeland and Taylor (2004) provide an extensive survey of the trade and 
environment literature. Earlier research has examined the relationship between 
variations in trade flows and regulatory costs using cross sectional data, but most 
studies of this type find no supporting evidence of PHE (e.g. Grossman & Krueger, 
1993). Common with studies using cross-sectional data, these studies suffer from the 
endogeneity problem that arises as unobserved industry characteristics or government 
policy making affect trade flows and environmental costs at the same time. Under 
these circumstances, net imports and PAC are determin d simultaneously, which may 
lead to insignificant or even counterintuitive result  when testing PHE.  
Recent papers attempt to control for endogeneity by using either the instrumental 
variable or structural equation approach. Ederingto and Minier (2003) model US net 
imports and environmental regulations as determined by a simultaneous equation 
system, where the level of environmental regulations in an industry as a function of 
trade flows, tariffs, and a vector of political-economy variables. In both equations, 
regulatory stringency is measured using PAC of 4-digit SIC industries from 1978 to 
1992. Controlling for both simultaneity and cross-equation correlations of 
disturbances in the model, their 3-stage least squares (3SLS) implementation yields a 
statistically significant and fairly large impact of environmental costs on trade flows.  
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Using environmental costs as a measure for the stringency of environmental 
regulations, Ederington et al (2005) discuss and empirically test a couple of potential 
reasons that have led to mixed results in the PHE literature. After controlling for the 
issues like regulation similarity, mobility, and relative importance of PAC, they find a 
significant effect of PAC on net imports for the following cases, 1) trade transactions 
between developed and developing countries, 2) industries with high pollution 
intensity, and 3) footloose industries, defined as industries with higher mobility and 
lower fixed costs. More recently, Levinson and Taylor (2008) develop a theoretical 
model of environmental costs and international trade, and demonstrate how 
unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and aggregation issues prevent previous 
studies from detecting PHE. In their empirical analyses, the authors use weighted 
average of states’ characteristics as instruments for PAC in order to control for the 
issues identified in the theoretical model. Using data on PAC and US trade with 
Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing industries f om 1977 to 1986, Levinson 
and Taylor (2008) find that industries facing increasing abatement costs experienced 
significant increases in net imports. Although briefly mentioning that using aggregate 
abatement cost may lead to a biased measure of regulation change, the authors make 
no effort to examine this issue in more detail. 
2.2.2. Impacts of environmental regulations on the industry structure 
By using the industry average PAC as a proxy for regulatory stringency to test the 
impacts of environmental regulations on international trade flows, the PHE literature 
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makes two implicit assumptions so that changes in PAC can fully reflect changes in 
regulatory stringency. Firstly, firms within an industry respond to changes in 
regulations in an identical way - they will use thesame pollution control method and 
exert the same level of abatement efforts to meet the new regulation requirement in 
order to have the same level change of PAC. Secondly, it is implicitly assumed that 
there is no intra-industry reallocation in terms of production and market share, and 
thus each firm fully absorbs the impacts of regulation changes. However, these two 
assumptions may not be the case under many circumstances.  
With the availability of micro-level data since the 1990s, various empirical studies 
using plant or firm level data have demonstrated th existence of large and persistent 
productivity differences among firms in the same narrowly defined industry 
(Bartelsman & Doms, 2000; Melitz, 2003; Tybout, 2000). Not only firms are 
heterogeneous, they respond differently to changes in regulations which will result in 
a new equilibrium of the market structure. Millimet et al. (2009) provide an extensive 
discussion of theoretical studies analyzing the potntial effect of environmental 
regulations on the market structure through changes in production costs. These 
models allow endogenous entry and exit, but assume identical/symmetric firms, and 
abstract from economies of scale and technological innovation. The universal 
conclusion is that under certain conditions, tighter regulation discourages entry, 
induces exit, and has a negative impact on the equilibri m number of active firms 
(e.g. Farzin, 2003; Lahiri & Ono, 2007; Requate, 2005). Focusing on market 
competition, Heyes (2000) finds that environmental regulations may favor large 
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firms, increase entry barriers and may encourage predatory behavior by incumbents. 
On the empirical side, a handful of papers have examined firm dynamics and changes 
in the industry structure following changes in environmental regulations. Dean et al. 
(2000) demonstrate that the greater stringency of environmental regulations 
discourages small business formations, but has no effect on the formation of large 
plants. Focusing on the attainment/non-attainment dsignation of the air quality 
regulation, Becker and Henderson (2000) find that te tougher regulation in the non-
attainment area favors the less regulated single-plant firms while creating an incentive 
for the larger plants to relocate to the attainment areas with less stringent regulations.   
Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) find greater sunk costs encourage firms to 
expand in order to bear the regulatory burden. Those unable to do so suffer a loss in 
profitability and are ultimately forced to exit the industry. In the same spirit, Snyder 
et al. (2003) examine the impacts of tighter regulations on chlorine-manufacturing 
plants and find that tightening up regulations accelerates plant closures, which further 
lead to a market share increase by cleaner firms. Using panels of plants from the 
Census of Manufactures, Gray and Shadbegian (2003; 2002) specifically examine 
differences in the impacts of regulations across different plants in the pulp and paper 
industry. Both papers provide direct evidence of significant heterogeneity across 
firms in productivity levels and their sensitivity to regulatory stringency. 
Findings from the above literature suggest that 1) firms are heterogeneous within 
even a very narrowly defined industry, and will respond to changes in regulations 
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differently, and 2) changes in environmental regulations together with firm-
heterogeneity may lead to intra-industry reallocation. In the following sections of this 
chapter, I develop a firm-heterogeneity model and show that tightening up 
environmental regulations will induce the heavily polluting, high abatement cost 
firms to contract or even exit the market, while threlatively low cost firms to stay in 
the market and expand. The asymmetric composition cha ge within the industry 
prevents the industry level PAC from fully capturing effects of changes in the 
environmental regulatory stringency.  
2.3. A model of firm heterogeneity in abatement efficiency 
Consider a narrowly defined industry that consists of a continuum of heterogeneous 
firms. Each firm uses capital and labor to produce an intermediate output F and 
generates pollution Z as a joint output. Under the pressure of environmental 
regulations, each firm chooses a fraction of F for abatement activities in order to 
reduce the level of pollution. The setup of firms choosing a fraction of F for 
abatement closely follows Copeland and Taylor (2003). I expand the standard 
Copeland and Taylor model by adding firm-heterogeneity in abatement efficiency. 
Within each narrowly-defined industry, firms are differentiated only in their 
productivity in the abatement process, denoted by . And the final output y is the 
level of output left after the abatement activity (Equation 2-1). 




 = 	, ; 																							2 − 1  
In practice, there are various sources that can lead to firm-heterogeneity in the 
abatement process and abatement costs. For example, large firms may have higher 
level of  and lower per unit abatement cost compared with small firms due to 
economies of scale, or because they can afford the cost of research and development 
for better abatement technologies. In addition, firms may be at different stages of a 
learning curve complying complex environmental regulations. The more experience a 
firm has in pollution control activities and dealing with regulations, the better they 
perform at choosing abatement technologies and using them more effectively. Firms 
may also be able to lower the transaction cost in the administrative process complying 
with a certain regulation as they become more experienced, e.g. the cost associated 
with applying for a water discharge permit is much higher for the first time than 
renewing one afterwards.  
Consider the properties of the pollution level  = 	, ; 	. Pollution is increasing 
and convex in potential output F, meaning the more a firm produces the higher level 
of pollution it will generate, and at a higher speed ( > 0,  > 0. On the other 
hand, the more a firm devotes the intermediate product to abatement activities, the 
lower level the pollution is left ( < 0). An important feature of this model is 
 < 0, which implies that a firm with higher abatement efficiency will have lower 
level of pollution, all else equal. Now assume pollution regulation is in the form of a 
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pollution tax1. Each firm chooses its output level and the input share for abatement in 
order to maximize its profit, which is equal to the revenue left after paying pollution 
tax, variable production cost and fixed cost. 
max, 			  −  ∗   1 − 	, ; 	 − ! 1 −  − "																						2 − 2 
Optimal level of choice variables: 
∗ = − + !$
	 ∗ = 1 −  + ! 						2 − 3 
Firms’ profits are increasing in abatement ability within a certain industry, as 
suggested by Equation 2-42. This is straightforward from the setup of the model---
because firms of the same industry are only differentiated in their ability to abate, 
different levels of pollution and thus compliance cost is the only factor that 
differentiates firms in the profitability.
 
 
&'∗& = &'∗& ()∗,)∗ = −|)∗,)∗ > 0													2 − 4 
Assume that in a given industry, the spectrum of differentiated firms has abatement 
productivity within the range	 ∈ [. , /]. For the industry to be non-trivial, assume 
                                                 
1 Change of the tax to either a pollution cap or a standard will not change the results qualitatively. 
2 Equation 2-4 is obtained by the Envelope Theorem. 
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that the most abatement productive firm in the industry has a positive profit, i.e. there 
will exist at least one firm with	/such that '	/ > 03. When an industry is in 
equilibrium, the least productive firm active in the industry has abatement 
productivity level .	such that '	. = 0. Thus	.	is the zero-profit cutoff value of 
productivity, such that any firm that has productivity below this value will 
immediately exit. 
In the dynamic version of the model, a fraction of firms enter and exit the market 
randomly in each and every period. At the beginning of each period, there is a large 
pool of potential entrants with productivity level ranging  ∈ [.2, /] and each has a 
probability 3 of entering the market. Note that only the firms with productivity level 
above the cutoff value will actually enter the market and start production. For every 
existing firm, there is a probability of death $  in every period, irrespective of its 
productivity, due to idiosyncratic shocks.  
In the steady state, a fraction $ of the existing firms randomly exit the market every 
period. At the same time, there is a constant inflow of potential entrants with >.  to 
replace those exit. In the steady state equilibrium, the inflow equals the outflow 
(3 = $), so that the average productivity levels of enteri g and exiting firms are 
equal (Equation 2-5). This leads the average industry-level productivity to remain the 
same in each period. 
                                                 
3
 Positive profit is possible in equilibrium here because firms are differentiated within the industry. 
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4 5&5∈6789 = 4 5&5∈6:58 														 2 − 5 
To examine the impacts of regulations on the industry dynamics, consider the case of 
tightening up environmental regulations, which raises compliance costs and reduces 
profits for all firms4. The reduction in profitability will thus raise the requirement on 
the abatement productivity to maintain a zero profit, as suggested by Equation 2-65.  
&.& = −.< > 0																	2 − 6 
Therefore, the increase in regulatory stringency results in a new zero-profit cutoff 
.>	with	.> > .. Any existing firms with the productivity level below the new 
cutoff,  . ≤  < .>, will be forced to shut down. It also raises the entry requirement 
in terms of abatement productivity, i.e. potential entrants with productivity level	. ≤
 < .>will no longer be able to enter and stay in the market. More stringent 
environmental regulation will therefore reallocate resources and the market share 
toward more abatement efficient producers by inducing only the more productive (in 
the abatement process) firms to survive and expand, the less productive firms to 
shrink and exit the market, and at the same time by allowing only the more abatement 
productive potential entrants to actually enter the market. The entry of more 
abatement-efficient firms and exit of less efficient firms thus cause an intra-industry 
                                                 
4 Profit is decreasing in environmental tax: 
@A∗@8 = BA∗B8 C)∗,)∗ = −  ∗3D∗ , ∗;  < 0 
5 Equation 2-6 is obtained by total differentiating the zero-profit condition. 
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composition change, where resources are reallocated towards more abatement-
productive, low abatement cost firms.  
Now consider the following measure, the industry leve  PAC per unit of value added 
(Equation 2-7). As reviewed in Section 2.2, this ratio is widely used as a proxy of 
regulatory stringency in the empirical literature examining the impact of 
environmental regulations on international trade flows. Here PAC is measured as  
times total production cost as each firm devotes a share  of their total inputs for 
abatement. Value added is by definition the value of output less the value of input.
   
 
E = F GHI	&J<F KHLLJ< & =
F ! 1 −  &J<F  − !	J< & 																			2 − 7 
To see whether E  can actually reflect the changes of regulatory stringency, I will 
examine in further detail of the expression 
@N@8 , which is the change in PAC caused by 
a marginal change in environmental tax. The results in Equation 2-8 show that 
changes in the aggregate level PAC led by a change in th  emission tax includes two 
components: 1) an intensive margin OP, i.e. the abatement cost change if all firms 
would survive and there were no composition change; and 2) the extensive margin 
O3 ∗ @<@8 ,  which depends on how the cutoff productivity will change in response to 
the regulation change, and indicates the cost change due to firm entry and exit, and 
the resultant industry expansion and shrinkage (see App ndix A. for derivations). 
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&E& = OP, , !; /, .  O3, , !; /, . &.& 										2  8 
 
Figure 2-1. Intensive and extensive margins of abatement cost change 
The aggregate level abatement cost, which is a mix of the two margins, may 
understate the change in regulatory stringency if the extensive margin offsets some of 
the intensive margin effect. To see whether this is the case, take an increase in 
pollution tax for example. The PAC of each firm, and thus the industry-wide PAC, 
will rise due to increase in regulatory stringency (the intensive margin). At the same 
time, existing firms with low efficiency and high ab tement cost will be forced to 
shut down. Similarly, potential entering firms with relatively low efficiency and high 
cost will no longer be able to enter the market (while as they were able to enter before 
the regulation change). At the same time, only the high efficiency, low abatement cost 
firms will survive and expand.  The extensive margin w ll therefore lead to a decrease 
in the average PAC in an industry as the market share is allocated to the more 
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abatement efficient and low abatement cost firms (Figure 2-1). Therefore, the 
industry level PAC does not rise as much as it should in order to reflect the actual 
change in regulations. The above analysis also implies that the existence of the 
extensive margin may cast doubts on the empirical results in the previous literature 
that uses the aggregate level PAC in testing PHE.  
2.4. Empirical evidence from decomposition analysis   
In this section, I use decomposition analysis to empirically identify these intensive 
margin effects, which more accurately represent the effects of changes in regulations 
on cost, from the extensive margin effects. The basic methodology of decomposition 
analysis is to separate the total change of an economic variable into the impacts of a 
couple of factors that affect the variable of interest, by allowing only one factor to 
change at a time while holding all others constant. To examine the change in the 
abatement cost, I decompose the aggregate cost change into the change for a fixed set 
of industries and that due to changes in the industry structure. In recent years, 
decomposition analysis has gained its popularity among energy and environment 
economists to analyze the change of the industrial energy intensity and pollution 
emissions (e.g. Ang & Zhang, 2000). The goal of decomposition in these studies is to 
separate the changes of the energy intensity or pollution reduction in each sector, 
those associated with the industry structure shift, and any technological progress (Ang 




For any aggregate n-digit SIC sector, the change in the abatement cost per unit of 
output can be decomposed into two changing factors: 1) cost intensity change at m-
digit SIC sub-industry level (with m>n, i.e. m-digit SIC is at a more disaggregated 
industry level), which corresponds to the intensive margin; and 2) change in the 
composition of industries, or the structure of the sector, which corresponds to the 
extensive margin6. Firms’ entry and exit will alter the relative importance of 
industries and lead to industry expansion and contraction. I use the share of value 
added7 to denote the relative importance of each industry.  
The goal of this analysis is to explain the change i  PAC/value added (PAC/VA) in 
an n-digit SIC sector, k, which contains several m (m>n) digit SIC industries. The 
aggregate cost intensity is denoted as the weighted av rage of the cost intensity at the 
disaggregated industry level, using the share of value dded as weights. Further let 
RST8 = UVWUVX denote the share of value added of a certain m-digit industry j in n-digit SIC 
industry at time t, where KHT = ∑ KHSS . And let	ES8 = ZV[WUVW  denote the PAC per unit 
in industry j at time t. The change in PAC/VA in aggregate industry k is∑ RST8 ES8S −
∑ RST8D3ES8D3S . 
                                                 
6
 With firm-level data, the decomposition analysis can be applied at firm-to-industry level. I perform 
the decomposition at a more aggregated level (4-digit to 3-digit and 2-digit SIC level) due to data 
constraint. These results should be indicative of what is happening at a higher level of disaggregation. 
7 The two terms “share of value added” and “output share” are used interchangeably in the rest of the 
chapter to refer to the same concept. 
 22 
 
The annual abatement cost change at the aggregated sector is represented by the 
difference between the weighted average of the sector’s cost intensities across two 
years. The relative importance of industries, which may be altered by firm entry/exit 
and industry expansion/shrinkage, is denoted by the share of value added. As shown 
in Equation 2-9, the total cost change D can then be decomposed additively to the 
intensive margin at before change output share, the extensive margin at before change 
abatement cost intensity, and an interaction term8.  
Total cost change:  
L = ∑ RS8 ∗ ES8 − ∑ RS8D3 ∗ ES8D3SS = L578 + L\:8 + L578\9]^85_7															2 − 9        
Intensive margin: L578 = ∑ RS8D3 ∗ aES8 − ES8D3b																																										2 − 10S  
Extensive margin: L\:8 = ∑ RS8 − RS8D3 ∗ ES8D3		S 																																								2 − 11        
Interaction term: L578\9]^85_7 = ∑ RS8 − RS8D3 ∗ ES8 − ES8D3S 																		2 − 12 
The measure of intD calculates the intensive margin effect at before-change output 
shares by holding each industry’s share of value added constant at time t-1. As shown 
in Equation 2-10, it calculates what the PAC change would be if all 4-digit industries 
had produced last year’s output and generated the concurrent abatement costs.  By 
holding the relative contribution of each industry unchanged, intD  shows only the 
                                                 
8
 This decomposition is analogous to the product rule in calculus where &R ∗ E = R ∗ &E + E ∗&R + &R ∗ &E. 
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intensive margin of changes in PAC, and is thus indicative of the direction and 
magnitude of the change in the environmental regulatory stringency.  
On the other hand, the extensive margin L\:8 shows the change in PAC/VA due to 
changes solely in output shares, and is calculated as the level of PAC that would have 
been if each industry had generated last year’s cost intensity, allowing only the 
industry composition (measured as share of value add d) to change. It provides an 
answer to the question that if the abatement cost intensity of each industry remains 
the same as last period, what would be the aggregate cost intensity change due solely 
to the change industry mix.  
Finally, the last term is the interaction of the inte sive and extensive margins. More 
specifically, the interaction is the difference betw en two “intensive” changes, 
evaluated at the before-change composition ∑ RS8D3ES8−ES8D3S  and the after-change 
composition ∑ RS8ES8−ES8D3S , respectively. This interaction term captures the 
dynamic effect of the cost intensity and the industry composition changing 
simultaneously. This dynamic effect is missing from the two static effects,extD and
intD , as they are both calculated using the before-change year as the base year. 
2.4.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
I perform the above decomposition analysis using the data from the survey of 
Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) combined with the data on 
other industry characteristics from 1977 to 1986. The PACE survey is conducted by 
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the Bureau of Census, and draws from a probability sample of manufacturing 
firms/plants based on frames created from the previous years’ Census of 
Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1977). The PACE survey collects data on capital expenditures and operating costs 
related to pollution abatement. Pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) contain 
depreciation, labor, materials and supplies, servics and equipment leasing, and other 
costs related to operating and maintaining equipment for pollution treatment and 
prevention. Capital expenditures are used for purchasing and installing devices to 
abate pollutants through either end of line (EOL) technique or through changes in 
production process (CIPP). The survey results are published on the Current Industrial 
Reports, which report abatement capital expenditures and operating costs, and 
separately for different media (air, water, solid waste) as well as for hazardous/non-
hazardous pollutants (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). For various reasons listed in 
Appendix B, I use only the operating costs in decomp sition analysis as they are 
more reliable. In addition, the decomposition process requires the data to be a 
balanced panel. Missing values in PAC thus pose a major challenge. Assuming these 
data are missing at random, I interpolate the missing data using the average cost 
intensity at higher levels of aggregation. The process of data interpolation is 
described in Appendix C. 
Two issues may affect over time comparison of the abatement costs and expenditures. 
The PACE survey was conducted annually from 1977 to 1994 (except year 1987). 
After a redesign, the survey was continued to collet cost information in 1999, and 
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was redesigned and conducted again in 2005. Due to substantial changes made during 
the last two surveys, a historic comparison to earli r surveys was difficult9. Another 
issue relates to the definition of an industry. The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) updated SIC classification in 1987 and the SIC codes changed substantially. 
For all these reasons mentioned above, I use only the survey data up to year 1986 in 
this study to keep consistency. (More issues related to the PACE survey are discussed 
in Appendix B.)  
Besides the abatement cost information, data on other industry characteristics come 
from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, which is a joint effort 
between the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Center for 
Economic Studies (CES) at the U.S. Census Bureau. This database contains 
information on inputs, outputs, investment and productivity measures for all 4-digit 
manufacturing industries from 1958-1996, and are avail ble in both SIC72 and SIC87 
versions (Bartelsman et al., 2000). This database was constructed using data from 
multiple official sources including mainly the Census of Manufactures (CM) and 
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM).  
Table 2-1 presents summary statistics for data usedin the decomposition analyses. 
Variables of interest include PAOC, value added, PAOC per dollar of value added, 
and output share, of 4-digit SIC industries in 2-digit and 3-digit sectors, for the 345 4-
                                                 




digit SIC industries from 1977 to 198610. The absolute value of pollution abatement 
expenditures exhibit substantial variations across industries, which is mainly due to 
the sizes of the industries. After normalizing by the output level, the abatement cost 
intensity still varies substantially across industries. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 suggest per 
unit abatement cost over value added is 1.4% on average for the manufacturing 
industry, but range from 0.2% for the printing and publishing industries (SIC code 
27) to 6.6% of the primary metal industries (SIC code 33).  
Table 2-1. Summary statistics for 4-digit SIC industries, 1977-1986 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
paoc_va4 pollution abatement cost/value added 0.014 0.071 3428 
paoc4 pollution abatement costs, 4-digit SIC, $1m 26.2 7 112.202 3428 
paoc3 pollution abatement costs, 3-digit SIC, $1m 84.731 176.106 3428 
paoc2 pollution abatement costs, 2-digit SIC, $1m 579. 41 629.393 3428 
vadd4 value added, 4-digit SIC, $1m 2259.031 3417.656 3428 
vadd3 value added, 3-digit SIC, $1m 8240.804 7131.201 3428 
vadd2 value added, 2-digit SIC, $1m 58223.400 31331.070 3428 
weight3 share of value added of a 4-digit in 3-digit industry 0.344 0.313 3428 
weight2 share of value added of a 4-digit in 2-digit industry 0.050 0.090 3428 
 
 
Table 2-2. Average PAOC/VA for 2-digit SIC sectors, 1977-1986 
SIC code Industry 
PAOC/value added 
(sort from high to low) 
33 Primary metal industries 0.066 
29 Petroleum and coal products 0.036 
28 Chemical and allied products 0.030 
26 Paper and allied producs 0.020 
32 Stone, clay, glass products 0.013 
20 Food and kindred products 0.010 
24 Lumber and wood products 0.008 
21 Tobacco products 0.008 
                                                 
10 Excluding miscellaneous manufacturing industries (SIC 39). 
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22 Textile mill products 0.007 
34 Fabricated metal products 0.005 
30 Rubber, miscellaneous plastics products 0.005 
36 Electric, electronic equipment 0.005 
37 Transportation equipment 0.004 
25 Furniture and fixtures 0.003 
38 Instruments, related products 0.003 
35 Machinery, except electrical 0.003 
27 Printing and publishing 0.002 
 
 
Figure 2-2 shows PAC as a share of value added for the whole manufacturing sector 
from 1977 to 1986, and provides some evidence of the existence of the extensive 
margin effect. This graph follows Figure 2 in Levinson and Taylor (2008). I expand 
their graph by showing the trend at a more disaggregated industry (4-digit SIC) level. 
The top line plots PAC as a share of value added ovr time, holding the composition 
of 4-digit SIC industries fixed as in year 197711.  The top line is best interpreted as the 
intensive margin as it shows the impact of changes in regulations on a fixed set of 4-
digit industries. The second line from the top plots PAC/VA over time while holding 
the composition of 3-digit industries fixed at the base year 1977, and it suggests what 
PAC would have been if these industries and the share of each industry had remained 
unchanged. This second line thus represents the intensive margin at the 4-digit level 
plus the extensive margin among 4-digit industries (or the extensive margin within 3-
digit industries). Similarly, the third line from the top represents the intensive margin, 
plus the extensive margin within 3-digit industries and 2-digit industries. And finally, 
                                                 
11 More specifically, each point corresponds to weighted average PAC per unit of value added at 







∑ , where t is the current year. 
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the line at the bottom plots PAC/VA for the whole manufacturing sector, and it is the 
sum of the intensive margin plus the extensive margin at all levels of aggregation.  
 
Figure 2-2. Pollution abatement cost as a share of value added, 1977-1986 
The pattern in Figure 2-2 is indicative for the hypothesis that the aggregate level 
PACE data may understate the change in regulatory sringency due to the existence of 
the extensive margin. As regulatory stringency is gradually tightening up, the more 
polluting, high abatement cost firms and industries shrink while the lower cost firms 
and industries expand. Aggregate pollution abatement costs end up rising much less 
than what it should have been because the composition of industries has changed. 
2.4.3. Decomposition of the abatement cost intensity  
Using the methodology outlined in Section 2.4.1, I decompose the PAC change at the 
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2-digit SIC sectors using the production and abatement cost data from the 4-digit SIC 
industries. Table 2-3 presents the decomposition results at the 2-digit to 4-digit SIC 
level. I calculate the annual change of the weighted average PAC/VA compared to the 
previous year, using as weights of the share of value dded of each 4-digit SIC 
industry in the 2-digit SIC sector. All changes areexpressed as a percentage of the 
mean PAC/VA value in the previous year, which is presented in Column 1 of Table 
2-3. Columns 2 to 5 present the average of the overall change, intensive margins, 
extensive margins and the interaction term respectiv ly.  
The interpretation of these results is straightforward from the methodology. Take the 
year 1981 for example. The pollution abatement costas a share of value added 
increased about 4% for an average 2-digit SIC sector compared to 1977. It is 
premature to conclude that this change in PAC corretly proxies the magnitude of 
regulation changes. Actually the increase of PAC/VA should have been 10% if the 
mix of the industries is held the same as in the previous year. However, with the high 
PAC firms dropping out and industries shrinking, and the surviving firms and 
industries (together with the firms that just entered) have a cost advantage compared 
to those that exit. This change in the composition of i dustries leads to a 6% decrease 
(the extensive margin and interaction term together) in the observed sector-wise PAC. 
Thus the composition change offsets some of the intensive margin of the total 
abatement cost change, leading the total change to b  underestimated. 














    
1978 0.0118 8.75% 11.19% -1.64% -0.80% 
1979 0.0102 -13.58% -15.11% 3.45% -1.92% 
1980 0.0125 23.05% 26.62% -1.49% -2.08% 
1981 0.0130 4.04% 10.29% 0.06% -6.31% 
1982 0.0138 5.64% 12.65% 0.08% -7.09% 
1983 0.0152 10.15% 9.72% 1.30% -0.87% 
1984 0.0172 13.20% 20.08% -2.30% -4.58% 
1985 0.0175 1.96% 4.15% -0.45% -1.75% 
1986 0.0173 -1.44% 0.63% -1.00% -1.07% 
To further examine the variation of cost change across the 20 2-digit SIC industries, I 
present the decomposition results for each of those industries over years 1977 to 
1986. Table 2-4 presents the mean of changes of abatement cost intensity (weighted 
average PAC/VA) over the years 1977 to 1986 for each of the 2-digit SIC industries. 
Again, these numbers are all expressed as a share of th  average PAOC/VA value of 
1.4% to facilitate understanding of the magnitude. Almost all industries experienced 
abatement cost increase over the study period and there exisit considrable variations 
among different industries, from 0.6% for the tobacco products industry (SIC 21) to 
more than 400% for the petroleum and coal industry (SIC 29). Again, I further 
decompose this cost change to the intensive, extensive margin and the interaction 
term using the 4-digit SIC data. If the industry composition had remained the same as 
in the year 1977, the weighted average of  PAC would have increased even more 
(Column 2).The extensive margin effect offsets some f the cost increase by altering 
the mix of industries. More likely than not, firms in the relatively highly polluting 
industries shut down or lose market share to their competitors as the environmental 
regulations are tightening up over the years.Therefore the overall industry structure 
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has shifted toward a cleaner mix of firms and industrie . 
Table 2-4. Decomposition results by 2-digit SIC sectors, 1977-1986  
2 digit 







20 14.30% 17.30% 0.10% -3.10% 
21 0.60% 6.80% -2.00% -4.10% 
22 20.90% 25.40% -1.40% -3.10% 
24 23.00% 19.70% 0.30% 3.10% 
25 17.60% 16.90% -1.10% 1.80% 
26 18.30% 27.50% -4.00% -5.20% 
27 3.10% 2.70% 0.10% 0.30% 
28 34.10% 88.80% -27.10% -27.70% 
29 405.20% 491.70% -35.20% -51.30% 
30 16.60% 18.90% -0.20% -2.10% 
32 19.00% 26.00% -4.30% -2.70% 
33 117.00% 267.40% -43.70% -106.60% 
34 29.30% 27.80% 1.40% 0.10% 
35 9.50% 12.80% -1.30% -2.00% 
36 15.70% 17.80% -1.60% -0.50% 
37 21.60% 29.30% -2.30% -5.40% 
38 11.30% 12.70% -1.10% -0.30% 
Finally, I decompose the PAC change at each 3-digit SIC industry using the 
production and abatement cost data from the 4-digit SIC industries. Table 2-5 
presents the mean of decomposition results at this level, expressed as a percentage of 
average PAC/VA last year. The abatement cost change t the 3 to 4-digit level is 
smaller in magnitude for both the overall change and the decomposed intensive and 
extensive margins. These results are later used in the econometric analyses of PHE in 
Section 2.5. 


















     
1978 0.0118 11.81% 12.14% -0.17% -0.16% -0.33% 
1979 0.0102 -9.51% -9.40% 0.62% -0.72% -0.10% 
1980 0.0125 15.62% 17.30% 0.23% -1.92% -1.69% 
1981 0.0130 5.07% 14.07% 0.09% -9.09% -9.00% 
1982 0.0138 3.16% 5.04% 9.20% -11.09% -1.89% 
1983 0.0152 6.04% 5.94% 0.65% -0.55% 0.10% 
1984 0.0172 4.86% 10.09% -0.43% -4.80% -5.23% 
1985 0.0175 8.95% 7.61% 4.23% -2.88% 1.35% 
1986 0.0173 1.34% 4.08% -1.05% -1.68% -2.74% 
2.5. A re-examination of the PHE 
2.5.1. Potential issues with previous studies on PHE 
The empirical studies on PHE seek to detect the effect of environmental regulations 
on the international trade and investment flows, using PAC as a measure of regulatory 
stringency. Results from the theoretical model and decomposition analyses earlier in 
this chapter suggest that changes in PAC contain an extensive margin caused by the 
firm dynamics and the industry composition change in addition to the commonly 
perceived intensive margin. Therefore the aggregate level PAC will likely 
underestimate the changes in regulatory stringency a d lead to three econometric 
issues in estimating PHE. 
First of all, PHE in previous studies is estimated using PAC based on a truncated 
distribution that is conditional on firm survival and the realized industry composition. 
Aggregate PAC may fail to capture the full effect of changes in regulatory stringency 
if the composition has moved towards more abatement efficient and low abatement 
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cost firms and industries. This selection issue implies previous studies may under-
measure regulation change and may thus overestimate the rue PHE. Secondly, the 
existence of the extensive margins becomes a source f nonrandom measurement 
error in the PAC variable as the aggregate PAC deviat s from the intensive margin, 
which accurately reflect the changes in regulatory st ingency. The measurement error 
issue may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of PHE. Finally, international 
trade flows and the composition of firms and industrie  may be jointly determined, 
which leads to the potential problem of reverse causality in the PAC measure. Firms’ 
entry and exit as well as industries’ expansion and contraction can be partly the 
results of global (as well as domestic) competition. In fact, theories of international 
trade have suggested that industrial structures at different levels of aggregation will 
change during trade liberalization (e.g. Helpman, 1999; Melitz, 2003). By using the 
overall PAC as the explanatory variable, previous st dies on PHE lump together the 
intensive changes in PAC and the composition change, which is subject to the reverse 
causality issue.  
2.5.2. Empirical strategy: separating intensive and extensive margins when 
estimating PHE 
To solve the above mentioned econometric problems, I separate the intensive margins 
and extensive margins in estimating PHE, where the intensive margins are used to 
capture the variation in regulatory stringency, andthe extensive margin will control 
for any composition change caused by both environmental regulations and other types 
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of changes. More specifically, previous studies in the PHE literature generally 
examine the relationship between environmental regulation stringency and net 
imports, as shown in Equation 2-14, where NI denotes net trade flows, E58 =
cd!/fc denotes PAC intensity, the Xs are measures of trade barriers, L8s are time 
dummies, and !5s are time-invariant industry fixed effects. The key assumption to 
obtain consistent estimate of g is h∆E58> ∆j5k = 0, ∀m, .  However, endogeneity 
problems discussed in Section 2.5.1 may prevent consiste t estimations.   
no58 = p58q + E58g + L8 + !5 + j58 																	2 − 14 
I will separate the intensive and extensive margins, a d estimate the relationship in 
Equation 2-15, where all variables are defined the same except the three abatement 
cost measures12.  
  no58 = p58q + E57858g3 +E\:858g$ + E578\9]^85_758gr + L8 + !5 + j58 			2 − 15  
E57858 = E5ss + t ∆E57858)ss  
E\:858 = E5ss + t ∆E\:858)ss  
                                                 
12 An alternative way of estimating PHE while separating he intensive margins and extensive margins 
would be to first difference Equation 2-14, and usethe first-differenced ∆E578, ∆E\:8, and ∆E578\9]^85_7 as separate explanatory variables to substitute the overall PAC change. Theoretically 
first-difference (FD) and fixed effects (FE) estimations would generate similar results (with different 
standard errors when t>2). However, chapter 10.7.1 in Wooldridge (2010) suggests when strict 
exogeneity fails and only contemporaneous exogeneity holds, both FE and FD estimator have an 
“asymptotic bias”. In this case, FE estimators has an advantage over FD estimators with large T, as the 
bias in FE shrinks to zero at the rate 1/T while that in the FD estimator is independent of T. 
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E578\9]^85_758 = E5ss + t ∆E578\9]^85_758)ss  
The intensive margin of PAC in Equation 2-15, E57858, is derived as the abatement 
cost measure in the year 1977 at the 3-digit SIC level plus the sum of all intensive 
changes (∆E578) within 3-digit SIC industries up to the year t. Each of the intensive 
changes (∆E578) is calculated at 4 to 3 digit SIC levels using the decomposition 
methodology described in Section 2.4. This variable thus measures the environmental 
regulation induced the abatement cost change for a fixed set of industries (fixed at the 
4-digit level in previous year), which is free of changes in the industry composition. 
The coefficient on the intensive margin, g3 measures the marginal impact of the 
abatement cost change at the intensive margin on trade flows. Estimates of g3will be 
unbiased and consistent since the selection issue, the measurement error and the 
reverse causality issue are now controlled by including the extensive margins. This 
model is identified as environmental regulations and batement costs are changing 
sharply during the sample period while other factors affecting trade flows are only 
moving slowly. 
The extensive margins and interaction terms are obtained by adding the decomposed 
extensive changes and interaction terms to the base year PAC value. The two 
variables together indicate the changes in the abatement cost caused solely by 
changes in the industry composition at different leve s, that is, the entry, exit, 
expansion and shrinkage of firms, as well as the result d expansion and shrinkage of 
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industries. As the environmental regulation tightens, for example, resources and 
market shares are allocated towards the relatively high abatement-efficiency firms 
compared to the low efficiency ones. The coefficients g$ and gr thus measure the 
marginal impact on trade flows of potential changes in the industry composition.  
Note that the extensive margin in Equation 2-15 maystill contain the reverse 
causality issue as discussed in Section 2.5.1. Nonetheless, by using the decomposed 
PAC, my empirical strategy improves in the following ways. First of all, the variable 
of interest when estimating PHE is the intensive margin, which captures the effect of 
the regulation change on PAC for a fixed set of firms/industries and serves as an 
accurate proxy for the regulation change. While previous studies suffer from the 
selection issue and the measure error, I ensure that the estimated coefficient on the 
intensive margin is an unbiased and consistent estimate of PHE by separating the 
intensive and extensive margins. Further, the reverse causality issue mentioned above 
provides an additional source of bias in previous st dies that lump together the 
intensive and extensive margin effect. By separating these two effects, I ensure the 
estimate of  g3, the one we are more interested in, is consistent. In other words, the 
extensive margin serves as “quarantine” for the intnsive margin effects.  
Other control variables in Equation 2-15 include trade barriers between the two 
trading partners: import tariffs and transportation c sts. The international trade 
literature has suggested that these measures of trade barriers are major explanatory 
variables of the trade structure and volume. Previous studies in PHE have used trade 
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barriers in their estimates as well. Here import tariffs are calculated as import duties 
divided by custom values of imports. Transportation c sts are derived as the freight 
and insurance as a fraction of the net import value, or mathematically equal to 
Io		fcuvw − 	Hx	fcuvw/	Hx	fcuvw. CIF and FAS are terms used in international 
trade contracts, standing for cost, insurance and freight, and free alongside 
respectively. 
2.5.3. Data and summary statistics 
Equations 2-14 and 2-15 will be estimated at the 3-digit SIC level using the US trade 
flows with Canada, Mexico and the rest of the world from 1977 to 1986. As before, 
the data on PAC are from the PACE survey and the data on industry characteristics 
are from the NBER-CES database. Measures of the intensive and extensive margins 
are calculated by decomposing PAC of the US manufacturing sector at the 3-digit to 
4-digit SIC levels. The US trade data including imports, exports, tariffs and 
transportation costs by the 4-digit SIC category are obtained from the Center for 
International Data at the University of California, Davis (Feenstra, 2002), and are 
further converted to the 1972 SIC classifications ad ggregated to the 3-digit SIC 
levels. Table 2-5 provides definitions and summary statistics of these variables. 
Table 2-6. Summary statistics for 3-digit SIC industries, 1977-1986 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
niw net imports/value of shipment, world 0.0368 0.1759 1133 
dep1can net imports/value of shipment, Canada 0.0041 0.0514 1133 
dep1mex net imports/value of shipment, Mexico -0.0012 0.0070 1133 
paoc_va3 PAC/value added 0.0116 0.0207 1133 
pac_int intensive margin 0.0129 0.0312 1133 
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pac_ext extensive margin 0.0095 0.0204 1133 
pac_rsd interaction term 0.0066 0.0271 1133 
tariff tariff/value of imports 0.0518 0.0395 1133 
transp transportation cost/value of imports 0.0637 0.0398 1133 
 
2.5.4. Estimation results and discussions 
Estimation results from Equation 2-14 and 2-15 are presented in Table 2-7, where I 
test PHE using the US net imports from Canada (Columns 1 to 3), Mexico (Columns 
4 to 6) and the rest of the world (Columns 7 to 9). For each of these regions, I 
estimate three specifications. The first one is the standard PHE specification as in 
Equation 2-14 using fixed effects, and is a replicate of  Equation 2-9 in Levinson and 
Taylor (2008) (L&T hereafter) using the interpolated data. The second specification is 
based on Equation 2-15 where intensive and extensiv margins are included as 
separate explanatory variables. The coefficients of hese two variables measures the 
marginal impact on trade flows of abatement cost change within the 3-digit SIC 
industries (the intensive margin) versus the impact of hanges in the market structure 
(extensive margin and interaction term). In the third specification, I include both 
tariffs and transportation costs as measures for trade costs. 
For the first specification, the standard specification as in previous studies, the 
coefficients on PAC are positive and statistically significant as expected. Moving to 
the second specification, the estimated coefficients o  the intensive margin are 
positive and statistically significant for all three regions. This result suggests that 
tightened environmental regulations reflected by higher abatement costs at the 
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intensive margins will significantly increase net imports, which supports the PHE 
hypotheses. Specifically, coefficients in Columns 2 and 4 implies that net imports 
from Canada and from Mexico scaled by value of shipment are expected to increase 
by 0.362 and 0.047 percentage-point respectively when PAC as a share of value 
added increases by 1 percentage-point. This effect is greater in magnitude though less 
significant when looking at the results from the rest of the world (Column 8). 
However, I do not find evidence that the composition change (represented by the sum 
of the extensive margin and the interaction term) will lead to an opposite PHE. The 
estimated coefficient on the variable of the composition change is not statistically 
different from zero. 
Control variables representing the cost of trade have the expected negative impact on 
the trade volume. Higher import tariffs will lead to statistically significant lower 
levels of net import volumes, which is consistent for all geographic regions and for all 
specifications. The effect of the transportation cost is unclear. I only find a 
statistically significant negative effect for the international trade between the US and 
the rest of the world as a whole. This may suggest the ransportation cost is only one 
of the factors affecting the trade volume in general, but not for each and every 
country. There may be cases where other factors are the driving force of the trade 
structure and volume between the US and the foreign cou tries.  
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Table 2-7. Impact of environmental regulation on trade flows, 1977-1986 
 
Variables 
Canada Mexico The world 
Original Decom. Decom. Original Decom. Decom. Original Decom. Decom. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
PAOC/VA, imputed 0.537**   0.076**   1.003**   
 (0.040)   (0.015)   (0.233)   
intensive margins  0.362** 0.362**  0.047** 0.047**  0.526* 0.519* 
  (0.047) (0.047)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.277) (0.265) 
composition change  0.117 0.118  0.008 0.006  -0.140 -0.100 
  (0.073) (0.073)  (0.028) (0.027)  (0.430) (0.411) 
Tariffs -0.090* -0.084* -0.086* -0.070** -0.070** -0.067** -0.964** -0.949** -0.900** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.271) (0.270) (0.261) 
transportation cost   -0.013   0.026**   -0.826** 
   (0.017)   (0.006)   (0.094) 
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,133 
Number of SIC3 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.967 0.969 0.967 0.745 0.747 0.753 0.902 0.903 0.912 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes: Dependent variable is net imports scaled by value of shipments. All specifications include year and 3-digit SIC level industry fixed effects. 
Coefficients for regression constants and dummy variables are suppressed. 
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These results provide supporting evidence for my hypothesis that the intensive 
margin corrects the downward bias in using the overall PAC to measure regulatory 
stringency and thus leads to a more accurate estimate of PHE. The coefficients on the 
intensive margin variable are positive and statistically significant, which supports the 
PHE hypothesis that tightening up environmental regulations will lead to increased 
net imports. The magnitude of PHE is smaller for all three regions when using 
decomposed cost measures than using overall cost changes, which suggests that the 
overall abatement cost changes may underestimate the r gulation changes and thus 
lead to overestimated PHE. On the other hand, the extensive component of PAC 
changes has a very different, or even opposite impact on international trade flows as 
opposed to that of the intensive margin. The change i  industry mix is likely to lead 
to decreased net imports through the expansion of more abatement efficient, low 
abatement cost firms and industries, and shrinkage of the less efficient and high cost 
firms and industries. At the same time, other factors including other types of 
regulations, changes in trade conditions and demand side shocks may also affect the 
composition of industries. The results thus call into question earlier estimates of PHE 
that fail to account for the composition change.  
The lack of significance of the extensive margins ad interaction terms here may 
suggest the composition change across the 4-digit SIC and within 3-digit SIC 
industries alone may not be significant enough to drive an opposite of PHE. It is 
interesting to explore whether the composition change at a finer level (e.g., within 4-
digit SIC industries and across firms) together with those at a more aggregate level 
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will have a significant impact on trade flows. In addition, the composition of 
industries may be affected by other factors than enviro mental regulations, such as 
other government policies or demand side shocks. 
Understanding the magnitude of the estimation results 
It may seem counterintuitive that the PHE is larger for Canada than that for Mexico---
that the coefficients on the abatement cost measures are larger. However, the trade 
volume between the US and Canada is much higher than that with Mexico. The 
volume of imports from and exports to Mexcio are on average $42.8 and $67.1 
million per year while imports and exports with Canada amount to $278.5 and $225.3 
million per year over the sample period13, which means we cannot simply compare 
the coefficients and conclude the magnitude of PHE. To get a sense of the magnitude 
of PHE, or how much trade volumes is changing in response to abatement cost 
change, I use the following elasticities as derived by L&T. Let y3 = g Nz{z denote the 
trade elasticity with respect to abatement costs if the change in trade volume comes 
entirely from imports. Similarly, y$ = g Nz|} denotes the elasticity if the change in trade 
comes entirely from exports. Let E denote PAC/VA, M denote imports, and X denote 
exports.  
y3 = g E}~z = ~E E}~z − pE E}~z = y{N − y|N p}~z 											2 − 16 
                                                 
13
 Author’s calculation based on US trade data (Feenstra, 2002). 
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y$ = gE}p} = y{N ~zp} − y|N																																													2 − 17 
These two measures provide the upper and lower bound f how much the trade 
volume may change induced by the abatement cost change. I present the magnitude of 
the two elasticity measures in Table 2-8 and compare them with those in L&T. First 
of all, comparing results between Canada and Mexico suggest that the estimated PHE 
is of similar magnitude although the estimated coeffici nts differ by a large margin. 
Secondly, the elasticity measures further confirm that using the overall abatement 
cost change could overestimate PHE. Based on the elasticity measures, previous 
studies have overestimated PHE by a third on average. 
Table 2-8. Trade elasticities with respect to PAC 
 
Canada Mexico 
In L&T My result In L&T My result 
Trade elasticity 
with respect to 
abatement costs 
If the change in 
trade comes entirely 
from imports 
0.32 0.24 0.22 0.18 
If the change in 
trade comes entirely 
from exports 
0.45 0.32 0.17 0.11 
 
Robustness check 
One primary concern of interpreting the results involves using the interpolated 
abatement cost data (see Appendix C for more detail). To perform the data 
interpolation, I assume that the missing abatement cost data are missing at random. 
This assumption is not inconsistent with the fact that a major fraction of these missing 
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values are withheld to avoid disclosing operations f individual companies. T-tests of 
the original and the interpolated sample suggest that neither the mean nor the standard 
deviations of the variables are statistically different. To further explore whether the 
data interpolation affect estimation results, I compare estimation results obtained by 
using the original 3-digit SIC PAOC data with those obtained from the same 
specification but using 3-digit PAOC derived from aggregating 4-digit level 
interpolated data.  Results are presented in Table 2-9. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 2-
9 present results of Equation 2-14 using the original 3-digit PAOC data, while 
Columns 2, 4 and 6 re-estimate the same specification using 3-digit SIC PAOC 
derived from aggregating 4-digit level interpolated data. The estimated coefficients 
using the interpolated data are not qualitatively different from the results obtained 
from the original data. Comparing these two sets of results suggest that the estimated 
coefficients of the PHE are robust to the replacement of the missing values with the 
interpolated data.  
Table 2-9. Robustness check for using imputed data 
Variables Canada Mexico World (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAOC/VA 
0.544***  0.070***  0.928***  
(0.048)  (0.018)  (0.226)  
PAOC/VA, 
imputed 
 0.537***  0.076***  1.003*** 
 (0.040)  (0.015)  (0.233) 
Obs. 920 1,133 920 1,133 920 1,133 
Number of SIC3 114 114 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.970 0.967 0.765 0.745 0.906 0.902 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is net imports scaled by shipments. All specifications include year 
and 3-digit SIC level industry fixed effects. Coefficients for other control variables, 





This chapter investigates the impacts of environmental regulations on PAC and 
international trade flows, controlling for firm dynamics and changes in the industrial 
structure. PAC is widely used as a measure for the egulatory intensity in empirical 
papers examining the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows. However, 
environmental regulations affect not only the cost of each firm/industry but also the 
composition of the industries. Using a heterogeneous-firm model, this chapter shows 
that the industry composition change may lead to an extensive margin effect of the 
regulation in addition to changes at the intensive margins. This may cast doubts on 
the previous empirical research on PHE as aggregate ab t ment costs will likely 
understate the changes in regulatory stringency. I onduct decomposition analysis to 
demonstrate the existence and the magnitude of the extensive margin at the 4-digit 
SIC industry level.  
Using the decomposition results at the 3-digit SIC industry level, I estimate a 
modified version of PHE that allows separate impacts of PAC at the intensive and 
extensive margins to re-examine the relationship betwe n abatement costs and trade 
flows. By separating the composition change, the int nsive margin corrects the 
downward bias by using the overall PAC as a measure of r gulation change. Results 
from the fixed effects estimations suggest that the estimated PHE, represented by the 
coefficients on the intensive margin variable, is smaller than the values in previous 
studies. This confirms my hypothesis that the previous studies have overestimated 
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PHE by using the overall PAC measure.  
Analyses in the chapter suggest the needs for further esearch in understanding the 
economic impacts of environmental regulations. A natural extension would be to 
examine in further detail the extensive margin effects. Trade conditions can be used 
as instruments for the extensive margins in estimating PHE as trade theories have 
suggested that the trade liberalization will have an impact on trading partners’ 
industrial structure. It would also be interesting  the future work to take into account 
the role of innovation, which could simultaneously reduce abatement costs at the 








Chapter 3:  Determinants of the environmental standard setting: 
evidence from the NPDES program 
3.1. Introduction 
Environmental regulations and standards, together with effective enforcement actions 
to ensure compliance, are crucial to enhance enviromental quality. The National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program is the main device 
to implement the Clean Water Act (CWA), and has result d in significant 
improvement of water quality over the past few decas (US EPA, Office of 
Wastewater Management, 2012). Under the NPDES program, all point sources that 
discharge pollutants into the waters of the US are required to obtain permits from the 
regulatory agencies. One major component of the NPDES permit is an effluent 
limitation that specifies the maximum allowable quantity or concentration of a certain 
pollutant at the discharge points. Currently there are two types of effluent limitations, 
including the technology-based effluent limitations (TBELs) developed from the 
federal effluent limit guidelines for specific industrial sectors and the water quality 
based effluent limitations (WQBELs) if TBELs are not sufficient to ensure the level 
of water quality for its designated use (US EPA, Office of Wastewater Management, 
2012). The TBELs require industrial plants to meet two technology-based standards, 
namely Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology (BCT) for conventional 
pollutants and Best Available Technology Economically Achievable (BAT)  for toxic 
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and non-conventional pollutants (US EPA, 2010).  
Little is understood, however, about how regulators obtain knowledge about the 
regulated plants’ technology and then make permit setting decisions. EPA’s effluent 
guidelines specify a technology-based standard for each industrial sector while the 
regulated plants are free to choose the type of technology as long as the final results 
meet the required standard. In fact there is substantial heterogeneity across plants in 
the same industrial sector in terms of the technology choice (e.g. Section 4 in 
Millimet et al., 2009) and productivity (e.g. see Bartelsman & Doms 2000 for an 
extensive discussion). The permitting authority has limited information about the 
exact capacity of the best available technology imple ented at the regulated plants. It 
is unclear to the regulator, for example, whether a violation is due to inadequate 
abatement effort or technology constraint. The absence of complete information may 
lead to a non-optimal standard level. On one hand,  standard level lower than the 
technology capacity fails to fully capture the benefit of the best available abatement 
technology. On the other hand, a standard level beyond the technology constraint will 
discourage compliance as it may be too costly to comply – the plant may find it 
optimal to just violate the standard and pay the penalty. This may be especially true 
when the penalty amount is constrained, which is the case for the water regulation in 
the US (e.g. Harrington, 1988; Heyes, 2000).  
In fact, there is a rich theoretical literature on what should be the optimal standards 
and how the standards should be determined (Cohen, 1999). There is little empirical 
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evidence, however, on how the regulatory standards re determined and what factors 
affect regulators’ decision making. In this chapter, I propose that the regulators use 
plants’ environmental performance in the past to infer the information about the 
technology and abatement effort and to inform permit setting decisions. Previous 
empirical studies on environmental regulations have suggested that regulators make 
inspection and enforcement decisions based on plants’ performance and compliance 
history (Helland 1998; Stafford 2002; Kleit et al. 1998). These studies find that 
regulators tend to target inspections and enforcement on the plants with poor past 
performance. But none of them have examined the standard setting. To examine how 
past performance may reveal abatement effort, theoretical models have indicated that 
self-reporting behavior can be used as a signal of co peration and that the self-
reporting plants will perform better than the non-reporting plants (Innes 1999a; Innes 
2001). Empirical papers generally provide supporting evidence that the self-reporting 
plants have lower future violations (Toffel & Short, 2011). Regulators therefore 
reward self-reporting behaviors with less regulatory scrutiny (Stafford 2007; Innes 
and Sam 2008). For the NPDES program, regulated plants are required to report their 
discharge levels. In this chapter, I would like to examine whether these required self-
reports still provide useful information for the permit setting decisions. 
The question of the permit setting also has great implications for the examination of 
enforcement and compliance as compliance is defined as the actual discharge to the 
permitted level. There is a sizable empirical litera u e examining whether 
enforcement activities are effective at inducing better environmental performance 
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(Heyes, 2000). A common feature of these studies is to treat regulatory standards as 
fixed when examining how inspections and enforcement actions could bring 
compliance (see Stafford 2002, Shimshack and Ward 2005, 2008 for example). 
Regulatory standards used to define compliance status, however, is a choice variable 
of the regulator’s decision making process. The change of standards alone can change 
compliance status without any change in the actual discharge level.  
The NPDES program provides a good opportunity to explore the question of the 
permit setting. First of all, The NPDES permits aredetermined on a plant-by-plant 
basis and are required to be renewed at least everyfi  ears. At the time of the 
permit renewal, the permitting authority will review and adjust permitted limits (if 
necessary) to reflect changes in the production process and regulatory requirements 
(US EPA, 2010). These renewal events provide a great opportunity to examine the 
regulators’ permit setting decisions. Secondly, important technical and compliance 
information, such as production process, discharge lev l, compliance history and 
regulatory activities, is available to the permit writer as well as outside researchers 
through the EPA’s Permit Compliance System (PCS). We can therefore use these 
pieces of information to explore the determinants of the permit changes.  
Built on the theoretical framework of optimal standr s (Cohen 1999; Malik 2007; 
Arguedas 2008), I propose that the regulatory standards are determined by regulators’ 
perception of plants’ abatement effort and technology inferred from the past 
performance. More specifically, cooperative behaviors like self-reported violations 
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are a signal of pollution control efforts under theemporary technology constraint 
while certain non-cooperative behaviors indicate inadequate abatement efforts. The 
regulators (permitting authorities) are trying to decide an optimal limit to induce the 
highest efforts under the technology capacity. Using the permit and compliance data 
of the chemical manufacturing industry from 1990 to 2010, I investigate the 
determinants of the permit setting by estimating a multinomial logit and an ordered 
logit model that explain the relationship between plants’ environmental performance 
and the level of effluent limits in their NPDES permits.  EPA’s PCS dataset provides 
the primary source for data on the NPDES regulation, enforcement, and plants 
discharge and compliance history. Estimation results suggest that the plants with 
cooperative behaviors are more likely to receive lenient limits while violations due to 
inadequate efforts will get punished. These results lend support to the hypothesis that 
regulators decide the standard level based on the information received from past 
compliance history and on their perception of plants’ abatement effort. To the best of 
my knowledge, this study is among the first empirically examining the permit setting 
decision in the context of the water pollution regulation. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and introduces 
the background of the NPDES program in regulating the US water pollution. Section 
3.3 describes hypotheses, econometric models and data used. Section 3.4 presents 
estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes and discusses venues for the future research. 
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3.2. Literature review and background 
This section reviews the literature this study builds on and introduces the background 
of the NPDES program. After reviewing the theoretical models on the regulatory 
standard setting and noting the lack of empirical evid nce (Section 3.2.1.A), I 
examine two branches of the literature related to the regulatory decision making, 
namely the determinants of inspections and enforcement actions based on the past 
performance (Section 3.2.1.B) and self-disclosure behavior as a signal of cooperation 
(Section 3.2.1.C). A final literature this study contributes to is the one on the 
effectiveness of enforcement at ensuring compliance (Section 3.2.1.D). The second 
part of this section describes the permit setting process and other requirements of the 
NPDES program. 
3.2.1. Literature review  
A. Regulatory standard setting 
This chapter is closely related to the study on the s andard setting in environmental 
regulations. There has been a rich literature that theoretically examines optimal 
regulatory strategies (see Cohen 1999 for an extensive review). The typical setup of 
these models is a principle-agent model where that the regulators choose the 
regulatory standard, probability of inspection, and penalty levels in order to induce 
the compliance behavior. The standard result for an optimal policy is determined by 
the firm minimizing private cost (compliance cost) as well as regulator optimizing its 
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objective, for example, minimizing social costs as a sum of  regulatory cost, expected 
damage from pollution and firms’ compliance cost. The basic models have been 
further expanded in several ways, such as imposing costs of enforcement (Polinsky 
and Shavell 1992; Arguedas 2008),  allowing self-disclosing behavior (Malik 1993; 
Innes 1999), and moving to a dynamic setting with state-dependent enforcement 
strategies (Harford & Harrington, 1991; Harrington, 1988). 
A common feature of these models is that the final emission level is the only variable 
that the regulators care and used to determine compliance status. This is not the case, 
however, in the NPDES program, where complying with monitoring and reporting 
requirements is a major component of the regulation. In accordance with these 
requirements, Malik (2007) extends previous models by including an additional 
signal on the abatement effort that regulators would like to observe and make 
decision on. The additional signal can be obtained by the compliance inspection, 
which consists of examining the production and abatement process, reviewing 
records, verifying self-reports, and checking whether plants adopt the required 
procedures. By collecting information on efforts, the regulator can better assess 
whether a violation is due to inadequate abatement effort, or due to factors the firm 
are not able to control, like technology constraints. Malik (2007) concludes that in 
this case the optimal policy is more complex as it depends on both the final discharge 
level as well as the abatement effort revealed by the second signal. The results 
suggest that regulators are more likely to conduct investigations when the discharge 
level is in the middle range, or “gray area” as the author puts it, where the regulator 
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has limited information about the plants’ choice of effort. 
Noticing the distinction between effort and technology, Arguedas and Hamoudi 
(2004) analyze a model of optimal environmental policies where penalties will be 
contingent on the technology and the degree of violation. Firms will receive a more 
lenient regulation if it invests in better environmental technology. This arrangement 
could further save regulators’ inspection costs. Results from the theoretical model 
suggest that the regulator takes into account of technology constraint in the 
production and abatement process. Installing proper treatment equipment is taken by 
the regulator as a signal for cooperation as investing in better technology can save 
monitoring costs and reduce environmental damages.  
Despite the rich theoretical literature, empirical examination of standard setting in 
water pollution regulation is almost non-existence. One exception is Chakraborti and 
McConnell (2012), who empirically study the determinat on of NPDES permits for 
both industrial plants and public-owned treatment works (POTWs). Using a panel of 
permits for 100 plants in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania, the authors find that 
permit level gets relaxed when downstream water quality improves. Although 
studying NPDES permit setting, Chakraborti and McConnell (2012) focus on ambient 
water quality as a determinant of the limit level and have not examined limit levels 
based on the interaction between the regulator and egulated plants.  
Instead of directly studying optimal limit, there are a handful of papers trying to draw 
implications by looking at how permit conditions will affect plants’ behavior. 
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Theories predict that the effect of stringency on cmpliance levels will depend on the 
slope of the marginal compliance cost function. Brännlund and Löfgren (1996), for 
example, find that different groups of plants will respond to limit changes differently 
as shadow prices differ. Empirical studies generally support the theoretical prediction 
that plants’ responses depend on abatement costs. Using three measures to measure 
the limit stringency, Earnhart (2007) finds that compliance cost increases with limit 
stringency as limit level more stringent than federal standard will increasingly 
undermine environmental performance measured by actual-to-limit discharge. Plants 
will perform better, on the other hand, if the limit level is more stringent than the 
sample period mean. This suggests that the plants are able to adjust to temporary 
fluctuations in the limit, although the adjustment is non-smooth. In addition, better 
abatement technology and treatment process is time-consuming to implement. 
Earnhart (2009) explores whether permit conditions will affect plants’ response to 
enforcement. The author finds no evidence that more stringent limit level will 
undermine the effectiveness of inspection and enforcement, in terms of relative 
discharge. There is some supporting evidence that permit modification, an indicator 
of a more cooperative relationship between the facility and the regulator, will 
improve the effectiveness of regulator intervention. 
B. Decision making of inspections and enforcement based on past performance 
This chapter aims to provide empirical evidence on optimal permit setting and 
explore factors that will affect the regulator’s decision making. I propose that the 
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regulators decide the permit level mainly based on their perception of technology and 
abatement effort inferred from plants’ past performance. For this reason, this chapter 
is related to a sizable literature on how regulatory activities are decided on plants’ 
performance history. Focusing on inspection and enforcement actions, these papers 
have not studied the decision on standard setting. 
A paper by Gray and Deily (1996) is among the first empirical studies that use plant 
level data to examine the how regulators respond to compliance history in the US 
steel industry. Results from structural equation estimation show that regulators use 
plants’ compliance history in their decision making process, and that greater 
compliance leads to significantly less enforcement in the future. Helland (1998) 
obtains similar results by examining inspection, violation and self-reporting of pulp 
and paper plants in the US. The author finds that plants with a recent violation 
recently or with higher pollution levels are more like y to be inspected. Rather than 
studying the number of inspections, Rousseau (2007) examines the frequency of 
inspections on the textile industry in Belgium. Using firm-level inspection data from 
1991 to 2003, Rousseau (2007) estimates the time elaps d between inspections using 
a hazard model, where the hazard rate (length of time until inspection) is a function of 
variables denoting past inspection and past compliance status. Estimation results 
suggest that the likelihood of all types of inspections depend on previous inspection 
history and firms’ past performance, including past violations and complaints 
received. In addition to compliance and inspection history, the strategy for routine 
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inspection is also affected by firms’ production capacity. 
Previous studies have also examined the probability of inspections as determined by 
plants past environmental performance. Estimating the inspection and compliance 
simultaneously with a bivariate probit model, Stafford (2002) finds the probability of 
being inspected is higher if a plant was inspected or found in violation in the past 
year, or has higher probability of violation in the context of hazardous waste 
regulation in the US. The results suggest that the regulators target inspection 
resources towards plants that have had a poor environmental performance in the past 
and are suspects of being out of compliance. Hanna d Oliva (2010) have also 
concluded that lagged inspections, penalties, as well as missions levels have a 
significant positive impact on the probability of inspection on air emissions. Eckert 
and Eckert (2010) explore response of inspection to past compliance even further by 
studying whether inspections are spatially correlated. The probability of inspection is 
modeled as a function of compliance history at own and neighboring sites. Results 
from probit estimations imply that regulatory and compliance history at neighboring 
sites also matters for regulator’s decision on inspection in addition to a plant’s own 
history.  
The above mentioned papers have all focused on inspection decision. Kleit et al. 
(1998), on the other hand, explore decision making o  penalty issuance in the context 
of water pollution regulation in Louisiana. Using inspection data during a 13-month 
period from 1993 to 1994, the authors estimate a probit and a tobit model to study the 
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likelihood and severity of penalties respectively. Estimation results suggest that the 
occurrence of past violations tend to increase boththe likelihood and the severity of 
penalties. In addition, both initial penalties and fi al penalties after appeals are higher 
for more serious violations, like discharge without a permit or illegal discharge. 
C. Information gathering through self-reports 
As reviewed below, the idea of regulator decision making based on perceived 
information about abatement technology and effort is illustrated in the literature on 
environmental self-reporting. These studies generally show that 1) self-reported 
violations contain rich information on effort, 2) self-reporting plants are performing 
better than the non-reporting plants, and 3) regulators will make decisions based on 
information contained in the self-reports. 
Regarding the first aspect, Helland (1998) is among the first to empirically examine 
self-reporting behavior as a signal of cooperation. The results that plants with recently 
detected violations are more likely to self-report suggest that violations are costly and 
time-consuming to correct. Instead, violating plants use self-reporting as a way to 
signal their abatement effort and to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate. In 
fact, Earnhart (2007) finds supporting evidence that adjustment in the abatement 
process is non-smooth and time-consuming by examining the response of relative 
discharge levels to changes in effluent limits. Forthe same reason of signaling effort 
to regulators, other empirical studies have found that plants are more likely to self-
disclose a violation if  they are inspected frequently (Stafford 2007), are recently 
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subjected to regulatory activities (inspections, detected violations and enforcement 
actions), and if the plants are provided with relief from punishment for self-disclosed 
violations (Short & Toffel, 2008). In the framework of Malik (2007), these results 
suggest that plants are trying to send the second sig al on their own monitoring and 
abatement effort in order to decrease the gravity and frequency of future enforcement 
actions.  
Not only are these plants sending signals, the self-reporting plants have better 
environmental performance than the non-reporters. Theoretical models in Innes 
(1999) show that self-reporting plants will always engage in remediation effort 
whereas non-reporting firms only clean up when a violation is detected by the 
regulator. Furthermore, self-reporters do not engage in avoidance activities, defined 
as activities aimed to lower the risk of being detected and punished (Innes 2001). 
Toffel and Short (2011) provide empirical evidence that self-reporting is a reliable 
indicator of higher effort and better performance. By examining self-reporting and 
compliance behavior of air polluting plants, the authors find that self-disclosing plants 
have lower probability of violations later and are less likely to have accidental toxic 
releases. 
The regulators indeed receive the signals and make regulation decisions based on the 
information about abatement effort and cooperation se t through self-disclosure. 
Stafford (2007) finds that self-reporting is rewarded with a significantly lower 
probability of future inspections in the context of US hazardous waste regulation. 
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Studying enforcement and compliance of the Clean Air Act, Toffel and Short (2011) 
find significant reduction in both the probability and the number of inspections for 
plants that voluntarily disclosed a violation. The result that regulators shift 
enforcement resources away from these self-reporters indicates that signals are 
received and the regulators rely on this information o design their enforcement 
strategy. In addition to self-reports, participation n voluntary pollution reduction 
program (VPR) also reveals the abatement effort as it involves investment in self-
auditing and more efficient abatement technology. Innes and Sam (2008)  empirically 
examine plants’ participation in EPA’s 33/50 VPR, and concluded that VPR 
participation gets rewarded by the regulator in terms of less frequent inspections and 
enforcement actions. 
D. Environmental enforcement and compliance 
This chapter also contributes to the literature examining effectiveness of enforcement 
at inducing compliance and better environmental performances (Cohen, 1999; Heyes, 
2000). Despite the theoretical frameworks on optimal standard, regulatory standard is 
assumed to be fixed and exogenous in almost all of the empirical papers. Few studies 
have paid attention to the role regulatory standards play in the interaction between 
regulators and regulated plants. 
A number of papers have concluded that the threat of inspection is effective at 
inducing compliance. Laplante and Rilstone (1996), for example, examine the impact 
of inspection threat on water pollution discharge of the pulp and paper industry in 
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Quebec. The predicted probability (or the threat) of inspection, estimated as a 
function of plant characteristics and previous inspections, is found to have a strong 
negative impact on pollution levels. Telle (2009) adopts a similar approach to study 
the effect of inspection threats on both compliance decision and the levels of emission 
using a sample of Norwegian manufacturing plants. After controlling for unobserved 
plant heterogeneity, estimations results suggest that inspection threats have a 
substantial negative effect on violations, but the eff cts on emission levels are not 
clear. Eckert (2004) examines threat of inspection through warnings in the context of 
petroleum storage regulation in Canada. The author estimates a two-stage probit 
model of an inspection equation and a compliance equation, and finds that past 
warnings increase the probability of an inspection, which further decreases the 
probability of a violation. The results thus imply that warnings can deter future 
violations through the threat of stronger enforcement.  
Besides the threat of inspection, Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008) find that the 
threat of penalties could significantly reduce violation as well as pollution levels, 
even for the complying plants. Using data from the pulp and paper industry for 1988-
1996, Shimshack and Ward (2005) find a two-third drop in state-level violation rate 
the year after a penalty. Notably, the deterrence impact on the non-sanctioned plants 
in the same state is almost as strong as the actual imp ct on the sanctioned plant. The 
authors further indicate that the substantial effect is obtained by the regulator's 
increased credibility to impose a penalty. Using a similar dataset, Shimshack and 
Ward (2008) find the complying plants (at every quantile of discharge level) will 
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reduce discharge level even further after observing a penalty on another plant in the 
same state in the past year.  
In all of the papers mentioned above, regulation sta dards are assumed to be fixed 
when assessing compliance. There are two problems with this assumption. First of all, 
environmental compliance is defined as actual discharge or emission level relative to 
the standard level. Compliance status will change as the standard level changes even 
if the actual performance is staying the same. For example, a previously violating 
plant may be categorized as in compliance if its NPDES permit gets relaxed while 
actual discharge level remains the same. Secondly, theoretical models on 
environmental enforcement and compliance indicate that the standard level can be 
determined jointly with probability of inspection ad level of penalty in the 
regulator’s optimization problem (see for example Amacher and Malik 1996; 
Arguedas 2005). This chapter therefore contributes to the understanding of 
enforcement and compliance by incorporating permit setting into the regulator’s 
decision making process. 
3.2.2. Background of the NPDES program 
The NPDES permit program is the main tool under the Clean Water Act to control 
water pollution in the US. Under the NPDES program, ll point sources, including 
industrial plants and POTWs, that discharge pollutant into the waters of the US have 
to obtain a permit. An NPDES permit is a license for discharge, which typically 
consists of wastewater effluent limitations as well as monitoring, record keeping, and 
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reporting requirements (US EPA, 2010). The current NPDES program requires two 
levels of control – the technology-based effluent limitations (TBELs) and water 
quality-based effluent limitations (WQBELs) if technology-based limits are not 
sufficient to provide protection of the water body (US EPA, Office of Wastewater 
Management, 2012). Following is a brief summary of the permitting and renewal 
process, as well as other NPDES requirements. For more details, please refer to 
EPA’s documents and a web-based NPDES permit writer t aining program (US EPA, 
2010; US EPA, Office of Wastewater Management, 2012). 
Chemical manufacturing plants, as well as other industrial facilities, are required to 
renew their NPDES permits at least once every five years. At the time of permit 
renewal, the permitting authorities (typically the states) will review and adjust the 
effluent limits, if necessary, for changes in production and abatement process, water 
quality standards, and other regulatory requirements.  
The NPDES permitting process starts from the facilities submitting a permit 
application. After verifying the completeness and accuracy of the application, the 
permit writers of the issuing authority start developing a permit on both technical and 
regulatory basis. The first major step in the development process is to establish 
TBELs based on federal effluent limitation guidelins (ELGs) for a specific industrial 
sector. The TBELs require industrial plants to meet two technology-based standards, 
namely BCT for conventional pollutants and BAT for t xic and non-conventional 
pollutants. CWA designated the following 5 pollutants as conventional pollutants:  
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biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), total suspended soli s (TSS), pH, fecal 
coliform, and oil and grease (US EPA, Office of Wastewater Management, 2012). 
This dissertation studies the discharge of BOD from chemical plants. As BOD is 
defined as a conventional pollutant, only BCT is relevant for the discussion in the rest 
of this chapter. TBELs are performance-based pollutant controls with no specific 
technology required. Instead, the facility can choose any technology as long as final 
results meet the specific levels of performance (e.g. BCT) established in the CWA. 
The next step in the permitting process is to develop water quality based effluent 
limits. To develop WQBELs, the permit writer first identifies pollutants of concern 
and the applicable water quality standards (WQS), which are criteria for designated 
uses of specific water bodies as specified by the stat . The permit writer then 
determines the need of WQBEL by characterizing the interaction between the 
effluents and receiving water using engineering models. WQBELs must be 
established if the discharged pollutants have “reasonable potential” to cause the state 
WQS to be violated. Chemical-specific limits (maximu  daily and average monthly 
limits) for a facility are then calculated based on waste load allocation (WLA) 
developed by engineering models. Comparing the TBELs and WQBELs, the more 
stringent of the two will be decided as the final limit.  
The permitted plants are further required under the NPDES program to conduct their 
own monitoring and report the results to the permitting authority using the Discharge 
Monitoring Report (DMR), which is a standard form tha  facilitates data entry and 
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compliance review. The permitting authorities conduct compliance inspections 
occasionally to examine the monitoring process, verify the accuracy of the reports 
and make their own assessment about the compliance status. To ensure that the self-
reported monitoring results are accurate and reliabl , appropriate self-monitoring and 
reporting requirements are also specified in the NPDES permit. Nonetheless, the 
plants have the flexibility to choose from a range of EPA-approved methods for 
analyzing the samples (US EPA, 2010). This creates th  possibility for the plants to 
strategically use an analytical method for their benefit. 
3.3. Empirical methodology and data 
In this section, I propose three testable hypotheses on how the plants’ behavior will 
affect permit setting decisions based on previous literature on regulation and 
enforcement. I further present econometric models and data to perform the empirical 
analyses to test these hypotheses.  
3.3.1. Hypotheses 
The ultimate goal of the NPDES permits is to protect water quality for a water body’s 
designated use by controlling the end-of-pipe pollutant discharge. The regulated 
plants aims to minimize private costs consisted of abatement cost (positively 
correlated with abatement effort) and expected penalty once found in violation. The 
effort level is not observable to the regulator, while the discharge level is observable 
and verifiable during inspections. The objective of the permitting authority is to 
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minimize social costs consist of water pollution damage, enforcement costs and 
plants’ compliance costs by choosing a standard level and enforcement strategy. The 
derived optimal standard is a function of plants’ abatement effort given technology 
capacity as well as enforcement costs. Since neither the effort level nor the specific 
technology is observable to the regulator, the regulator will use information received 
from plants’ past performance to infer actual level of effort and technology.  
The first source of information about technology and effort is revealed from self-
reported numeric violation in the monthly DMRs, whic  is a requirement by the 
NPDES program. On one hand, the outcome that actual discharge exceeds the 
permitted level could be results of either technology constraint or lack of abatement 
effort. The regulators do not have enough information about which is the case by 
simply judging from the monitoring reports. Permitting decisions will likely depend 
on numeric violations together with other sources of information. On the other hand, 
the fact that a numeric violation is truthfully recorded and reported in the DMR 
reveals additional information about effort level. 
Although the program specifies certain monitoring ad reporting requirements, a 
careful examination of the regulation suggests that plants have the flexibility to 
choose different methods analyzing the samples for reporting. Therefore, truthfully 
reporting numeric violation can be viewed as self-disclosing behavior to some extent. 
It may imply, for example, that the plant has already spent a reasonable amount of 
abatement effort but still fail to achieve the limit level specified in the permit due to 
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temporary technology constraint. As suggested by previous studies, adjustment in the 
abatement process is time-consuming, which causes the plants to choose self-
disclosure as a way to signal their abatement effort before a better result (e.g. lower 
level of discharge) can be observed. Self-reporting plants will later keep their promise 
and indeed perform better than the non-reporting plants (Earnhart, 2007; Helland, 
1998; Malik, 2007). Theoretical models suggest thatself-reporting plants will always 
engage in efficient remediation and will not engage in avoidance behaviors (Innes 
1999; Innes 2001).  Empirical studies provided supporting evidence that self-
reporting plants are more likely to stay in compliance and less likely to have 
accidental toxic releases (Toffel & Short, 2011). Because federal regulations require 
the NPDES permits be developed based on best available technology, violations due 
to technology constraints suggest that the previous l mit level might be too tight given 
the current technology and should be relaxed. The first hypothesis concerns whether 
self-reported violations reveal additional information and whether they are used by 
the regulators during the permitting process. 
Hypothesis 1: To the extent that the plants have the flexibility in analyzing samples 
for reporting purposes, truthfully reporting a violation can be viewed as a 
cooperating behavior and will lead to more lenient limit levels. 
The second source of information involves explicit non-cooperative behaviors, which 
can be detected electronically in EPA’s Permit Compliance System or during 
compliance inspections. First of all, there are certain monitoring and reporting 
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requirements specified in NPDES permits, for example, reporting using DMRs. 
Failure to submit DMRs or submitting DMRs with substantial missing data indicate at 
least inadequate abatement effort. These behaviors are not inconsistent with 
avoidance activities where the plants are trying to prevent serious violations from 
being discovered (Innes 2001). Secondly, one of the major objectives of inspections is 
to examine pollution control operation and maintenance (US EPA, Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, 2007).  Improper peration and 
maintenance detected during inspections will be regarded by the regulator as lack of 
abatement effort. Although the exact level of technology capacity is not identified, 
these explicit non-cooperative behaviors imply thatit is technically feasible to 
perform better given appropriate incentives. Therefore, violations resulted from 
inadequate abatement effort are expected to encourage tightening up regulatory 
stringency in addition to imposing enforcement actions. In fact, previous studies have 
shown that more stringent limit will induce higher effort within the technology 
constraint (Alberini et al., 2008; Earnhart, 2007). Furthermore, tighter permit is in 
effect an additional penalty - extra cost in order to achieve compliance status - which 
is expected to have a deterrence effect. These observations lead to the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Violations due to inadequate abatement effort or avoidance activities 




Finally, as the NPDES permit contains water quality-based control, I expect ambient 
water quality to have an impact on the permitted efflu nt levels. In fact, Chakraborti 
and McConnell (2012) have found that regulators in Maryland, Virginia and 
Pennsylvania respond to downstream water quality when writing permits for both 
POTWs and industrial facilities. Focusing on chemical manufacturing plants, I would 
like to test whether this is a common practice of permitting authorities in other states. 
In addition, the impact of other variables will also depend on water quality, which 
defines the bottom line of NPDES permits. The final level of effluent limits is 
determined by WQBELs if TBELs are not sufficient to protect the water body for its 
designated use. This implies that if a violation is serious enough to affect local water 
quality, it is expected that the limit level will be tightened no matter what are the 
reasons for the violation (either effort or technology related). 
Hypothesis 3: The regulator will relax (tighten) the limit level if downstream water 
quality is good (poor).  
3.3.2. Econometric models 
There are three outcomes of a permit renewal event:  a higher (relaxed), unchanged or 
lower (more stringent) limit, denoted by 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Define the 
probability that outcome j is chosen as 
S = d[ = ],  = 0,1,2 
These probabilities are modeled as a function of variables representing plants’ 
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environmental performance and regulatory activities in the past. I first estimate a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model, where the explanatory variables are outcome-
invariant while the coefficients vary across outcomes14(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
More specifically, the probability of observing outcome j is 
S = d[ = ] = waS + qSb∑ wT + qTT∈{P,3,$} ,			 = 0,1,2 
I will also use an ordered logit (OL) model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In the 
ordered logit model, outcome j will occur if the later variable ∗lies in between two 
thresholds, SD3 < 5∗ ≤ S. And the probability of observing outcome j is 
S = d[ = ] = dSD3 < 5∗ ≤ S
= waS + qSb1 + waS + qSb − waSD3 + qSb1 + waSD3 + qSb,				 
 = 0,1,2 
The assumption for the OL model is that the odds across each two outcomes are 
proportional. If the data satisfy the proportional odds assumption, the ordered logit 
estimation is more efficient than the multinomial logit. Later when I present the 
results, I will test for the proportional odds assumption. The sign of the coefficients of 
                                                 





the ordered logit model can be interpreted as determining whether or not the latent 
variable ∗ increases with the regressors. Both the MNL and OL models are 
estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. 
 = u = ∑ ∑ 5Su5SS∈{P,3,$}5)3 . 
In addition to estimating the coefficients, it is al o interesting to interpret the 
estimation results in terms of marginal effects on the predicted probabilities of a 
change in the explanatory variables, calculated as  
BWB: = 5SaqS − q̅5b with q̅5 =
∑ 5q  for continuous variables, and W: = d[ = |, 5 = 1] − d[ =
|	, 5 = 0] for dummy variables. 
3.3.3. Data and variables 
My sample consists of 303 major chemical manufacturing plants (SIC code 28) for 
the time period from 1990 to 201015 (see Figure 3-1 for a map of these plants). The 
chemical manufacturing industry is one of the most water polluting industries in 
terms of conventional pollutants like BOD and TSS. “Major” industrial facilities are 
determined based on specific criteria developed by EPA or the states, and generally 
depends on the significance of the discharger's impact on the environment (US EPA, 
2012b). I focus on major facilities because they discharge the majority of wastewater 
from this industry. Plant-level data on effluent limits, pollutant discharge level, 
                                                 
15 There are 416 major chemical manufacturing plants, with only 303 plants with numeric limitations 
on BOD in their NPDES permits over the sample period. 
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compliance history, inspections and enforcement actions come from EPA’s Permit 
Compliance System (PCS). The PCS also contains information on permit issuance 
and expiration date, which is used to identify permit enewal events. This study 
examines effluent limits on BOD, which are the most common pollutant in this 
industry and one of the five conventional pollutants EPA is focusing on. The 
corresponding ambient water quality is measured by issolved oxygen (DO). Data on 
water quality come from EPA’s Storage and Retrieval (STORET) data warehouse, 
US Geological Survey (USGS) National Water Information System (NWIS) and state 
regulatory agencies in the case where data are not available from the other two 
sources.  
 
Figure 3-1. Map of major chemical manufacturing plants in the U.S. 
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The dependent variable: permit renewal outcome 
The dependent variable is the outcome of a permit renewal event, whether and to 
what direction the effluent limits specified in the NPDES permit will change.  
 = 0,								"	Ĝ − Ĝ D3 < 01,								"	Ĝ − Ĝ D3 = 02,								"	Ĝ − Ĝ D3 > 0 
Ĝ  is the limit level for a specific discharge point of a plant in cycle c, and is measured 
as pounds per day (lb/day) for either daily or a 30-day average. According to the 
NPDES program, these numeric limitations are expressed as mass limitations unless 
the guideline allows or requires concentration limitations. For most of the effluent 
guidelines, the numeric standards are expressed in t rms of mass and are based on 
some measure of the level of production at the facility. For example, if the effluent 
guideline is expressed as 5 pounds of pollutants per 1000lb of raw materials, the 
calculated limits will be 50 pounds per day for a pl nt that uses 10,000 pounds of raw 
material a day.   
One data issue involves multiple limit levels for a specific discharge point at a plant 
within a cycle, which is most likely due to tiered limits. Tiered permit limits are 
defined as limits that only apply to the discharge when a certain threshold (e.g., 
production level), specific circumstance (e.g., batch discharge), or timeframe (e.g., 
after 6 months) triggers their use (US EPA 2012). About 15% of all permits in the 
Chemical Manufacturing industry (SIC28) are tiered limits. In this study, I keep only 
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the lowest limit level for the case of tiered limits to avoid double counting of permit 
change. The calculated dependent variable would be the change of the lowest tier 
across cycles. 
Explanatory variables 
The dependent variable, permit renewal outcome, is modeled as a function of 
variables describing past performance and regulatory ctivities. Summary statistics 
are presented in Table 3-1. 
A. Numeric violations 
I include the number of self-reported numeric violati ns in the past three years as 
explanatory variables to examine the impact of numeric violations and any 
information revealed on the permitting decision.  A numeric violation is identified if 
the actual discharge reported in DMR exceeds the permitt d effluent limits. Plants are 
required to monitor, record, and report their pollutant discharge in the monthly 
DMRs. The submitted DMRs containing monitoring results are electronically 
compared with the effluent limits and other requirement specified in the NPDES 
permit in EPA’s system to decide compliance status. Although the monthly DMR is a 
requirement by the NPDES program, the plants have the flexibility to choose from a 
range of EPA-approved methods for analyzing the samples (US EPA, 2010). Plants 
may therefore have the incentive and possibility to strategically choose an analytical 
method for their benefit. To this extent, truthfully reporting numeric violations may 
still be regarded as a cooperating behavior by the regulators and may lead to more 
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lenient future permits. Nevertheless, numeric violat ns in DMRs provide regulators 
just one source of information as these violations could be results of either inadequate 
abatement effort or technology constraints. Final permitting decisions will depend on 
self-reported numeric violations together with other sources of information such as 
those from inspection activities.   
B. Absent DMRs 
Failure to submit DMRs or missing important data entri s in the DMR can be a 
violation that reaches the level of significant non-compliance (SNC) classification 
(US EPA 2012, CWA/NPDES Compliance Status). Absent DMRs classified as SNC 
will typically trigger a review by the regulator tofurther collect information, to 
determine compliance status, and to determine the need for a permit modification. 
Absent DMRs could therefore affect permit setting decisions to both directions. On 
one hand, absent monitoring reports may imply that t e plant is trying to hide 
performance and other important information from being discovered by the regulator, 
which is a non-cooperating behavior. If this is the case, the permit level will be 
tightened as stated in Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, absent DMR consists of very 
limited information while final permitting decisions will depend on more 
comprehensive information. There will be reviews conducted by the regulators after 
absent DMR violation to find out more information about the plant’s performance and 
monitoring and reporting process.  
C. Past Inspection and inspection results 
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The third factor that may affect permit level is inpection. NPDES permits are 
expected to be tightened up if non-cooperative behaviors or lack of abatement effort 
are detected during inspections (Hypothesis 2). Besides determining compliance 
status with permit conditions, one of the main objectives of inspection is to obtain 
information about abatement effort, for example, to examine operation and 
monitoring process and to verify the accuracy of the self-submitted DMRs (UA EPA, 
2004). Although the exact level of maximum feasible effort is highly costly to 
identify, the lack of appropriate maintenance and abatement effort is relatively easy 
for the inspector to discover. Inspections could be either sampling or non-sampling 
inspections. During sampling inspections, the inspector will take representative 
samples in order to decide compliance status with discharge limits and verify the self-
submitted reports as well. During non-sampling inspections, such as compliance 
evaluation inspections, the inspection will review documents and visually examine 
facilities, effluents and receiving waters to verify whether the permitted facility is in 
compliance with operational requirements and effluent limits. 
Violations detected during inspections, or “single event violations” are also included 
in the model. The most frequent single event violati ns are 1) violation detected 
during inspection 2) improper operation, maintenance, monitoring or sampling, 3) 
unauthorized discharge or by-pass, 4) late or inaccur te DMRs. These are indicators 
of insufficient effort in the abatement process (improper operation and unauthorized 
discharge), not cooperating with regulators (unauthorized discharge and late DMRs), 
and even trying to avoid being discovered of a violat n (not submitting DMRs). 
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These violations are related with the lack abatement effort rather than technology 
constraint of a plant. In this case, it is expected that the regulator will use a tighter 
permit to prompt higher abatement effort from these plants (Hypothesis 2). In 
addition, when a violation is found during inspection, the inspector is able to collect 
related information about the violation in order to decide the cause, e.g. whether it is 
technology or effort related.  
D. Past enforcement actions 
A fourth factor that regulators use to obtain information when deciding the permit 
renewal is the enforcement history. Enforcement actions are expected to be followed 
with tighter NPDES permits if they indicate serious violations that harm the local 
water quality (Hypothesis 3). Enforcement actions occur when violations (of any 
type, e.g. violations of discharge limits, violations related to operation and 
maintenance, unauthorized discharge, other reporting violations) are found, either 
through self-reporting or inspection. The types of actions include monetary penalties 
and non-monetary enforcement actions, for example, notice of violations and 
administrative orders that require the plants to correct the violations. In the 
estimation, I separate monetary penalties from non-m etary enforcement actions16. 
For penalty I include in the estimation both a dummy indicator and the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of penalty in the past three years. I expect the dollar 
amount of penalty to have an impact on permit levels as it reveals both the severity of 
                                                 
16 A complete list of formal and informal enforcement ac ions can be found in EPA’s data dictionary 
(US EPA, 2012b).  
 78 
 
violations (the extent of deviation from compliance) and regulator’s ability to use 
monetary sanctions as an enforcement tool. When a rgulator is capable to levy 
penalty without constraint, the regulator is less likely to change the permit level as an 
additional enforcement tool. 
E. Water Quality 
The final set of variables that may affect permit level is ambient water quality. The 
corresponding ambient water quality measure for BOD discharge is dissolved oxygen 
(DO). Higher level of DO generally indicates better water quality, as insufficient 
oxygen dissolved in the water will harm aquatic lives like fish. Low levels of DO are 
expected to be associated with tightened permits if the regulators do respond to local 
water quality. In addition, the impact of other variables will also depend on water 
quality as the final level of effluent limits is determined by WQBELs if TBELs are 
not sufficient to protect the water body for its designated use. This implies that if a 
serious violation will lead to tighter permit no matter what are the reasons for the 
violation (either effort or technology related). 
Data on ambient water quality is obtained from three sources 1) EPA’s Storage and 
Retrieval (STORET) data warehouse, 2) USGS National Water Information System 
(NWIS), and 3) state’s department of environmental quality in states where water 
quality data is not available in the previous two sources (e.g., Texas, Louisiana and 
Illinois). Water quality data is then matched with manufacturing plants using 
ArcMap®. I find the nearest one or two monitoring stations with DO data to a plant on 
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ArcMap®, and retrieve the water quality data from the station(s). A majority of the 
missing data results from 1) failure to identify a nearby monitoring station; or 2) the 
sample periods of the NPDES permits and the observations from monitoring stations 
do not overlap or have limited overlap. 
F. Other control variables 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in plant characteristics, I include in the 
estimation a dummy variable indicating whether a plant belongs to a multi-plant or 
single-plant firm. The status of a multi-plant firm ay affect permitting decisions in 
two aspects. Compared with single-plant firms, multi-plant firms may be heavy 
emitters as they are generally larger in size and have igher production capacity. 
Plants belong to the multi-plant firms may become the target of state regulators and 
draw more regulatory scrutiny. On the other hand, the multi-plant firms may be have 
more experience complying with regulations, more lik ly to afford to hire experts or 
consultants dealing with regulatory issues, and mayhave larger bargaining power 
compared with those smaller, single-plant firms. 
Because of missing values in the water quality data, I include watershed fixed effects 
together with time fixed effects to control for water quality as an alternative. The 
watershed fixed effects would capture any time invariant watershed-specific 
heterogeneity. Watersheds are identified using the USGS Hydrologic Unit Code 
(HUCs) at the region level, which is the highest leve  of HUCs.  
In addition, to control for unobserved heterogeneity of regulators (e.g. tougher 
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regulators may be more likely to levy a penalty andlower the limit level at the same 
time), I use state fixed effects as a measure for general regulatory stringency and 
other state characteristics. In most cases, the stat s are the permitting authorities - 
they issue permits, conduct compliance and monitorig activities, and take 
enforcement actions - while EPA only plays an oversight role17. State fixed effects 
would capture unobserved heterogeneity in terms of toughness across different state 
regulators. I have also included presidential administration fixed effects to control for 
any political and economy-wide factors that could affect state regulators decision 
making. 
Table 3-1. Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. dev. 
numviol:1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant had 1 self-
reported numeric violation in the past 3 years 
840 0.074 0.262 
numviol:2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant had 2 self-
reported numeric violation in the past 3 years 
840 0.031 0.173 
numviol:>=3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant had 3 or 
more self-reported numeric violation in the 
past 3 years 
840 0.037 0.189 
d_absent Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant had absent 
DMRs in the past 3 years 
840 0.121 0.327 
d_singviol Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant had a 
violation detected during inspection in the past 
3 years 
840 0.052 0.223 
insp: 2-3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant was 
inspected 2 or 3 times in the past 3 years 
840 0.429 0.495 
insp: 4-9 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant was 
inspected 4 to 9 times in the past 3 years 
840 0.367 0.482 
insp:>=10 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant was 840 0.067 0.250 
                                                 
17 There are 46 states that have the permitting authority. Idaho, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, and DC and all territories (excluding US Virgin Island) do not have NPDES program 
authorizations (US EPA, 2010). 
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inspected10 times or more in the past 3 years 
EA:1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant received 1 
enforcement action in the past 3 years 
840 0.121 0.327 
EA:>=2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant received 2 
or more enforcement action in the past 3 years 
840 0.082 0.275 
d_pen Dummy variable equal to 1 if plant received 
penalty in the past 3 years 
840 0.083 0.277 
ln(penalty) Natural log of the dollar amount of penalty 840 0.786 2.648 
DO <= 5mg/L Spline for level of dissolved oxygen <= 5mg/L 179 4.966 0.258 
DO > 5mg/L Spline for level of dissolved oxygen > 5mg/L 179 3.170 1.695 
d_multi Dummy variable equal to 1 if a plant belongs 
to a multi-plant firm 
840 0.660 0.474 
 
3.4. Empirical results 
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 present results from MNL and OL regressions of NPDES permit 
renewal outcomes respectively. In both tables, Model 1 contains all explanatory 
variables except the water quality variable and is estimated using the full sample, 
Model 2 includes additionally state and administration fixed effects, and Model 3 
includes watershed and administration fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 contain 
water quality as an additional explanatory variable and are estimated using the 
subsample that has water quality data. Model 5 contains additionally state and 
administration fixed effects. For each of these specifications, I presented both the 
estimated coefficients and marginal effects. The margin l effects reported here are 
average marginal effects, or sample means of the marginal effects at different points 
of observation (Bartus, 2005). Average marginal effect (AME) is more suitable than 
the marginal effect at the mean (MEM) for my case a the several of the explanatory 
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variables are dummy variables that indicate different l vels of a single categorical 
variable. For the dummy variables, the reported AMEs imply that the average change 
in predicted probability of a permit renewal outcome if the dummy variable changes 
from 0 to 1.  I further tested for proportional odds in order to implement the ordered 
logit model. The null hypothesis of proportional odds is rejected using the full sample 
but I fail to reject the null for the subsample with water quality data at 10% 
significance level.  
3.4.1. Numeric violations  
As the plants have the flexibility to choose different methods in analyzing discharge 
samples, they are able to choose one that result in no or fewer numeric violations. To 
this extent, self-reported numeric violations may be viewed as an indicator of 
pollution control effort under technology constraint. Further, such cooperating 
behavior is hypothesized to lead to more lenient NPDES permits. To quantify the 
impact of past numeric violations, I include in theregression dummies for different 
levels of accumulated number of violations in the tree years preceding the permit 
renewal event. The dummies for zero violations are omitted as the base group, and the 
results on other dummies indicate effects relative to the no violation case. An 
alternative way is to include a continuous variable denoting number of violations. 
Nevertheless, including dummies for different ranges allows for possible non-
linearity in the effect of violations on permit setting decisions. 
In the first three models (Column 1 to 6), the effect of numeric violations do not have 
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a significant impact on permit change. Once water quality is controlled for (Column 7 
to 10), reporting two or more numeric violations makes it significantly more likely for 
a plant to receive a more relaxed permit, and less likely to receive a tighter permit. 
The results indicate that although DMRs are required, truthfully reporting numeric 
violations is still regarded by the regulator as a compliance effort. It is an indicator 
that the plants have already adopted best pollution control technology and have spent 
adequate abatement effort but still fail to reach the limit level due to technology 
constraint. This implies that the current NPDES limit is more stringent than required 
by the best available technology and is thus more likely to be relaxed in the future. In 
addition, plants may choose to use self-disclosure to send a signal of cooperation as 
adjustment in treatment technology and process is time-consuming (Earnhart, 2007; 
Helland, 1998). In this case, the regulator is more likely to relax the permit as a 
reward for the cooperation with the belief that the plants will adjust the abatement 
process as promised given enough time. This result lends support for Hypothesis 1, 
and is in accordance with the conclusions in previous studies that self-disclosure 
behavior is rewarded with less inspection and enforcement (Stafford 2007; Toffel and 
Short 2011).  This finding suggests that self-reporting plants are rewarded with less 
stringent performance standard in addition to relaxd regulatory scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the fact that actual discharge exceeds the permitted level could be 
results of either inadequate effort or technology constraints. Permitting decisions will 
depend on reported numeric violations together withother sources of information. 
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3.4.2. Absent DMRs 
Absent DMRs is a type of significant non-compliance that will trigger a compliance 
review by the regulator. To examine the effect of absent DMR on permitting 
decisions, I use a dummy variable indicating whether re has been such a violation 
in the three years preceding a permit renewal event. I fi d little supporting evidence 
for the hypothesis that absent monitoring reports will lead to tighter limit as they 
imply plants are hiding information from the regulator. Regression results from the 
MNL model show that absent DMR makes it more possible to both a more relaxed 
and a more tightened limit in the next cycle when water quality and state fixed effects 
are taken into account (Model 1-5). This result is be t explained by the case where the 
regulators do not acquire enough information from missing monitoring reports per se. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3.3., absent DMRs will trigger reviews by the regulator to 
further investigate the facility and the cause of missing reports. The permit setting 
decision will depend on additional information obtained from the review process 
following absent DMRs or a more extensive inspection process. 
3.4.3. Inspections and inspection results  
A. Inspections  
Inspection is an information gathering process for the regulators, with a focus on 
abatement operation and maintenance in addition to verifying final discharge level. 
Compared to receiving zero or one inspection, plants that received two or more 
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inspections in the past three years are significantly less likely to receive a relaxed 
limit and more likely to receive a tighter permit, with different bins of the inspection 
variable having similar effects in terms of magnitude. This effect is consistent across 
almost all specifications in the lower equation, and for both the MNL and OL models. 
This result can be explained together with the objectiv  of inspections and what 
previous studies have found about inspection. Firstof all, previous studies suggested 
that regulators target suspicious plants for inspection, especially those with a poor 
environmental performance (see for example Gray and Deily 1996; Stafford 2002). 
Next, the regulators are paying more attention finding out effort level rather than 
measuring end result during the inspections. One of the major objectives of inspection 
is to examine abatement operation, monitoring and reporting processes besides 
verifying the discharge level. With these two points in mind, the estimation results are 
best explained by the scenario where the regulator’s suspicion of violating plants is 
confirmed during inspections.  The suspects of violat ns - plants with frequent (two 
or more) inspections - are found not spending enough abatement effort. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, observing inadequate effort during inspections encourages the 
regulators to tighten up the permitted level in order to prompt a higher abatement 
effort from the plants. Having just one inspection,  the other hand, is probably the 
result of the EPA requirement that major plants should be inspected at least every two 
years, and may have less to do with the plants’ performance. The results further 




B. Violations detected during inspection 
Non-cooperative behaviors discovered during inspections are indicators of inadequate 
effort and are hypothesized to result in more stringent future permit. Once water 
quality is controlled for, violations detected during inspection (i.e. single event 
violation) will significantly increase the probability of tightening up the permit level 
in both the MNL and OL models (Columns 7 to 10 in Table 3-3 and Columns 4 to 5 
in Table 3-4 for the lower equation). This result provides supporting evidence for 
Hypothesis 2. As regulators observe improper operation nd inadequate pollution 
control effort, they tend to use tighter permit to induce higher level of effort. The lack 
of adequate effort indicates that it is technically feasible for the plant to achieve a 
better performance level given appropriate incentiv. 
For predicting a higher permit in the MNL model, however, having a single event 
violation makes it more likely to relax the permit (Column 7 to 10 in Table 3-3 for the 
higher equation). This seemingly counterintuitive result nevertheless confirms that 
inspection is an information-gathering process. Thepermitting decision will depend 
on information revealed during the inspection process in addition to the compliance 
status. In addition, these results should be considered together with the effect of 
enforcement actions. Regulator’s first response to a violation should be various forms 
of enforcement actions, e.g. notice of violations, administrative orders, and penalties. 
When the lack of effort observed during inspection d es not reach the level of a 
violation, it is an indicator that the limit level might be too relaxed. As the regulators 
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are not able to take enforcement actions in this case (no violation is identified), they 
have lower incentive to further relax the permit level. This explains why detected 
violations, compared to no violations, seem to encourage relaxing the permit level.  
These results together provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2. Both the 
procedure and findings of an inspection serve as an information-gathering process 
which will update the regulator’s previous assumptions. Common types of detected 
violations include improper operation and monitoring, late or inaccurate DMRs, as 
well as unauthorized discharge. As these detected violations are more effort-related 
(rather than technology related), the regulators tend o use tighter permit to induce 
higher level of effort if they decide that it is technically feasible for the plant to 
achieve a better performance level given appropriate incentive. On the other hand, a 
tighter permit also serves as an additional source of punishment as it implies higher 
cost to achieve compliance status. When inadequate effort is identified during 
inspections, regulators may change permit level as an alternative method to encourage 
abatement effort. 
3.4.4. Monetary and non-monetary enforcement actions  
Enforcement actions are correlated with violations, and are expected to affect permit 
setting decisions only if they reveal additional information about the violation, for 
example, the severity or the degree of water quality damage. In general, I find little 
evidence that past non-monetary enforcement actions will affect permit setting 
decisions. In both MNL and OL models, when not including water quality variable, 
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past enforcement actions (excluding penalties) generally have no significant impact 
on permit change. When water quality is controlled for, one enforcement action 
makes it more (less) possible for a tighter (relaxed) permit, but two or more 
enforcement actions have no additional effect if state FE is also controlled for (Model 
5). Non-monetary enforcement is typically in the form of notice of violations or 
administrative orders, which require facilities to correct non-compliance behaviors 
and results. The lack of significance on these variables seems to suggest that the 
plants are able to meet the correction requirements within a short period of time. The 
regulators therefore have no further incentive to revise the permit. 
I find supporting evidence that previous penalties have an impact on limit levels of 
NPDES permits as it reveals the severity of violatins and regulator’s ability to use 
penalty as an enforcement tool. Results from the MNL model indicate that large 
amount of penalty discourage permit change to either dir ction. The dummy variable 
for past penalty alone indicates that a plant is more likely to have a relaxed permit if it 
had penalties before (Model 1-1 to Model 1-4), while there is no significant effect 
once state FE is controlled for (Model 1-5). In addition, this positive effect of penalty 
diminishes and eventually leads to the opposite if the amount of penalty is large 
enough, as suggested by the negative coefficients and marginal effects on the natural 
logarithm of the penalty amount. The turning point for Model 1-4 is around $1100, 
which indicates that an increase in penalty will less likely lead to a relaxed limit if the 
penalty amount is greater than $1100. The effects of past penalties are consistent 
across different specifications in the MNL model, though it is only marginally 
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significant in the OL model. This result lends support to the hypothesis that the 
regulators are targeting the highly severe violations that may harm local water 
quality, as monetary penalty per se is an indicator of severe violation and the amount 
of penalty is positively correlated with the severity of the violation.  
The results in the MNL model in predicting a tighter p rmit may seem counter-
intuitive  – past penalties would discourage a tighter permit, and the larger the penalty 
amount, the stronger the effect. In the OL model, the amount of penalty encourage 
tightening up the permit (Model 2-4), but this effect becomes insignificant once the 
state FE is also controlled for (Model 2-5). These results suggest that simply having a 
penalty makes it no more likely to receive a more st ingent permit. A large amount of 
penalty, however, would discourage permit change to either direction and will more 
likely keep the permit level unchanged. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
regulators have less incentive to tighten permit level if they are able to use penalty as 
an enforcement tool. On the other hand, the regulators have higher incentive to revise 
the permit level as an additional enforcement if the ability of levying penalty is 
restricted. In addition, these findings are not inconsistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Highly severe violations (and thus high penalty) are more likely the combined results 
of both insufficient technology and inadequate abatement effort. When making 
permitting decisions, the regulators have no incentiv  to relax the limit level as the 
plant should be spending more abatement effort. On the other hand, the regulators are 
reluctant to tighten up the limit either because of the temporary technology constraint. 
As suggested by Earnhart (2007), regulations more stringent than a certain level can 
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undermine environmental performance. In this case, the best strategy is to keep the 
current permit level, while hoping the penalty alone will have the desired deterrence 
effect and encourage the plant to spend more abatement effort. 
3.4.5. Water quality  
I expect that the permitting authority will respond to local water quality when making 
permit setting decisions (Hypothesis 3). I use a spline for water quality with a knot at 
DO equal to 5mg/L as the effect may be different across different level of DO. DO 
level below 5mg/L is considered a distressed condition for aqua life. In the MNL 
model, neither of the spline terms for the level of DO have a significant impact on 
predicting relaxing the limit. In predicting a lower/tighter limit, a marginal 
improvement in water quality when DO smaller than 5mg/L will make it more likely 
to tighten the limit in the MNL model, while a marginal improvement beyond 5mg/L 
will discourage tighter permit in both the MNL and OL models (when state dummies 
are included). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the regulator aims 
to protect local water quality: the permits are more likely tightened up when DO level 
is low (e.g. water quality is poor below 5mg/L) even though the quality may be 
improving. Once the water quality improve beyond the critical condition of 5mg/L, a 
plant is more likely to receive a relaxed permit as expected in Hypothesis 3. These 
results suggest that state regulators in general do respond to local water quality when 
determining NPDES permit levels, consistent with findings in Chakraborti and 
McConnell (2012).  
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The results with water quality should be explained with caution for the following 
issues. First of all, data on monitored dissolved oxygen are limited. One of the 
reasons is failure to identify a nearby monitoring station from all possible sources 
including STORET, USGS and the state regulatory agencies. Table 3-4 presents 
number of plants matched and unmatched with a nearby water quality stations by 
state.  In addition, the matched monitoring stations may have limited years of 
observation. For example, the matched monitoring station of a plant with NPDES 
permit from 1990 to 2010 may have water quality data only from 2003 to 2007. 
Figure 3-2 presents the frequency of plant-by-year observations matched and 
unmatched with water quality data. Finally, there ar  cases where one plant is 
matched with multiple monitoring stations to obtain more years of observation. There 
may be inconsistency across these data since stations from different sources may use 
different methods to monitor the level of dissolved oxygen. 
Summary statistics for the two sub-samples with and without water quality data is 
presented in Table 3-6, together with results from t-test for equality of sample means. 
To examine the impact of missing water quality data, I performed a chow-test and 
failed to reject the null that there is no structural change across the two sub-samples at 
predicting permit levels (the p-value for the test statistic $30 is 0.708). 
3.4.6. Multi-plant status 
Multi-plant firms, compared to single plant firms, are significantly more likely to 
receive a tightened limit and less likely to receive a relaxed limit in both the MNL 
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and OL models. This is consistent with the hypothesis that regulators may target 
multi-plant firms as they are typically heavy dischargers of the water pollutants. In 
addition, this result could imply that multi-plant firms are more experienced at 
complying with the NPDES regulation and have more bargaining power when 
applying for NPDES permits. Therefore they have alrady obtained the most 
favorable condition at earlier rounds of permitting less likely to receive permit 




Table 3-2. Multinomial logit results: permit level change 
 
Equation Variables 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Higher d_absent -0.049 0.023 0.297 0.068 0.211 0.054 0.482 0.058** 1.876* 0.159*** 
  (0.290) (0.045) (0.332) (0.048) (0.322) (0.049) (0.714) (0.024) (1.102) (0.030) 
 numviol:1 0.506 0.103* 0.638* 0.113* 0.605* 0.110* -1.795 -0.161*** -1.883 -0.151*** 
  (0.334) (0.060) (0.383) (0.058) (0.363) (0.060) (1.138) (0.012) (1.216) (0.013) 
 numviol:2 0.208 0.071 0.386 0.099 0.484 0.110 0.378 0.150*** 0.549 0.164*** 
  (0.506) (0.087) (0.558) (0.086) (0.542) (0.092) (0.749) (0.029) (0.946) (0.027) 
 numviol:>=3 -0.642 -0.034 -0.393 0.009 -0.522 -0.008 -0.444 0.033 1.079 0.254*** 
  (0.528) (0.067) (0.611) (0.078) (0.566) (0.074) (0.837) (0.026) (1.162) (0.035) 
 d_singviol 1.810*** 0.301*** 1.307** 0.175** 1.236** 0.184** 2.288* 0.131*** 2.276 0.123*** 
  (0.466) (0.090) (0.513) (0.078) (0.499) (0.083) (1.357) (0.038) (1.555) (0.037) 
 insp: 2-3 0.316 -0.016 -0.145 -0.056 -0.039 -0.045 0.040 -0.104*** -0.067 -0.097*** 
  (0.299) (0.042) (0.363) (0.042) (0.347) (0.043) (0.779) (0.022) (0.985) (0.024) 
 insp: 4-9 0.559* -0.008 0.186 -0.041 0.353 -0.012 0.209 -0.085*** 0.054 -0.087*** 
  (0.311) (0.045) (0.424) (0.049) (0.393) (0.052) (0.808) (0.021) (1.092) (0.023) 
 insp:>=10 0.549 0.060 1.267* 0.092 0.852 0.072 -0.149 -0.092*** -0.696 -0.098** 
  (0.423) (0.074) (0.668) (0.104) (0.540) (0.091) (1.486) (0.032) (2.670) (0.038) 
 EA:1 0.005 -0.020 -0.166 -0.042 -0.128 -0.035 0.510 -0.008 -0.511 -0.097*** 
  (0.319) (0.041) (0.361) (0.037) (0.349) (0.039) (0.914) (0.024) (1.038) (0.017) 
 EA:>=2 -0.031 0.012 -0.241 -0.023 -0.171 -0.008 0.495 0.109*** -0.102 -0.011 
  (0.360) (0.052) (0.418) (0.045) (0.390) (0.048) (0.920) (0.033) (1.176) (0.026) 
 d_pen 4.352** 0.666*** 5.044** 0.652*** 4.985** 0.685*** 8.056 0.546*** 9.088 0.260 
  (2.004) (0.175) (2.265) (0.125) (2.102) (0.112) (5.690) (0.155) (6.291) (0.172) 
 penalty amount, log -0.436** -0.058** -0.499** -0.061** -0.486** -0.064** -0.840 -0.085*** -0.890 -0.057*** 
  (0.214) (0.028) (0.242) (0.028) (0.224) (0.028) (0.630) (0.016) (0.694) (0.014) 
 DO level <=5       0.784 0.046 1.601 0.118** 
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        (1.602) (0.052) (2.086) (0.053) 
 DO level >5       -0.005 -0.007* 0.027 0.008 




      -1.085** -0.146*** -0.808 -0.096*** 
        (0.459) (0.010) (0.584) (0.012) 
Lower d_absent -0.442* -0.092* -0.356 -0.092* -0.296 -0.077 0.237 0.012 1.214 0.069** 
  (0.264) (0.050) (0.291) (0.051) (0.284) (0.053) (0.663) (0.028) (0.949) (0.032) 
 numviol:1 -0.184 -0.080 -0.217 -0.092 -0.150 -0.079 -0.507 -0.024 -0.439 0.006 
  (0.328) (0.061) (0.354) (0.059) (0.345) (0.061) (0.641) (0.026) (0.707) (0.026) 
 numviol:2 -0.506 -0.120 -0.591 -0.139* -0.412 -0.118 -1.373 -0.248*** -1.588 -0.262*** 
  (0.493) (0.086) (0.524) (0.081) (0.507) (0.084) (0.980) (0.020) (1.008) (0.018) 
 numviol:>=3 -1.106** -0.183** -1.060* -0.172** -1.174** -0.188** -2.176* -0.295*** -2.018 -0.312*** 
  (0.486) (0.074) (0.556) (0.082) (0.524) (0.074) (1.157) (0.017) (1.258) (0.014) 
 d_singviol 0.638 -0.062 0.420 -0.031 0.370 -0.037 2.324* 0.235*** 2.059 0.190*** 
  (0.469) (0.078) (0.500) (0.080) (0.492) (0.081) (1.317) (0.040) (1.356) (0.042) 
 insp: 2-3 0.880*** 0.170*** 0.541* 0.121* 0.561* 0.121* 1.872* 0.326*** 1.491 0.263*** 
  (0.265) (0.059) (0.308) (0.063) (0.297) (0.062) (1.132) (0.047) (1.243) (0.049) 
 insp: 4-9 1.196*** 0.227*** 0.913** 0.179** 0.832** 0.155** 1.809 0.319*** 1.559 0.268*** 
  (0.273) (0.062) (0.355) (0.073) (0.336) (0.072) (1.159) (0.042) (1.305) (0.047) 
 insp:>=10 0.365 0.036 1.071* 0.108 0.697 0.077 1.121 0.245*** 0.499 0.136* 
  (0.402) (0.089) (0.566) (0.113) (0.484) (0.104) (1.634) (0.068) (2.213) (0.081) 
 EA:1 0.279 0.064 0.302 0.076 0.254 0.064 1.034 0.183*** 0.711 0.170*** 
  (0.254) (0.054) (0.283) (0.055) (0.276) (0.055) (0.780) (0.031) (0.871) (0.033) 
 EA:>=2 -0.244 -0.051 -0.112 -0.007 -0.228 -0.036 -0.354 -0.104*** -0.015 0.004 
  (0.317) (0.061) (0.372) (0.068) (0.351) (0.065) (0.949) (0.032) (1.117) (0.040) 
 d_pen 1.132 -0.268* 0.831 -0.281*** 0.801 -0.299*** 5.995 -0.078 8.190 0.198 
  (1.835) (0.146) (1.970) (0.107) (1.905) (0.097) (5.210) (0.154) (6.080) (0.173) 
 penalty amount, log -0.114 0.006 -0.069 0.021 -0.067 0.020 -0.565 -0.059*** -0.798 -0.092*** 
  (0.190) (0.037) (0.205) (0.037) (0.197) (0.037) (0.561) (0.020) (0.667) (0.022) 
 DO level <=5       1.015 0.155** 1.200 0.122* 
        (1.639) (0.071) (1.714) (0.067) 
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 DO level >5       0.096 0.020*** -0.074 -0.016** 




      -0.323 0.013 -0.083 0.037** 
        (0.398) (0.016) (0.510) (0.018) 
 Observations 840 840 840 840 840 840 179 179 179 179 
 log likelihood -847.0  -749.5  -790.5  -168.3  -143.5  
 χ² 71.95  267.10  185.10  41.36  90.93  
 p> χ² 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.081  0.047  
 Pseudo R2 0.041  0.151  0.105  0.109  0.241  
 president FE   yes  yes    yes  
 state FE   yes      yes  
 watershed FE     yes      
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 3-3. Ordered logit results: marginal effects of permit level change 
  Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 Model 2-5 
Equation Variables marginal effect marginal effect marginal effect marginal effect marginal effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Higher d_absent 0.044 0.056 0.039 -0.001 -0.029* 
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.016) (0.017) 
 numviol:1 0.078 0.089* 0.076 -0.044*** -0.056*** 
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.014) (0.014) 
 numviol:2 0.095 0.107 0.097 0.237*** 0.250*** 
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.030) (0.029) 
 numviol:>=3 0.065 0.062 0.072 0.222*** 0.319*** 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.031) (0.034) 
 d_singviol 0.182** 0.124* 0.126* -0.057*** -0.049** 
  (0.077) (0.072) (0.073) (0.020) (0.022) 
 insp: 2-3 -0.064** -0.055* -0.052* -0.150*** -0.093***  
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) 
 insp: 4-9 -0.084*** -0.073** -0.056* -0.120*** -0.090*** 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.014) (0.018) 
 insp:>=10 0.017 0.017 0.003 -0.084*** -0.059* 
  (0.048) (0.065) (0.055) (0.022) (0.033) 
 EA:1 -0.037 -0.049* -0.036 -0.069*** -0.099*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) 
 EA:>=2 0.032 -0.004 0.023 0.115*** 0.021 
  (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.027) (0.024) 
 d_pen 0.395 0.454 0.494* 0.301** 0.178 
  (0.323) (0.302) (0.281) (0.153) (0.155) 
 penalty amount, log -0.029 -0.034 -0.037 -0.033*** -0.020* 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) 
 DO level <=5    -0.015 -0.005 
     (0.018) (0.019) 
 DO level >5    -0.011*** 0.011*** 
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     (0.003) (0.004) 
 dummy for multi-plant firms    -0.053*** -0.055***  
     (0.009) (0.011) 
Lower d_absent -0.061 -0.073* -0.053 0.001 0.043 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.024) (0.027) 
 numviol:1 -0.099* -0.108** -0.095* 0.070*** 0.088*** 
  (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.025) (0.026) 
 numviol:2 -0.115 -0.123* -0.116* -0.220***  -0.225*** 
  (0.071) (0.068) (0.070) (0.017) (0.016) 
 numviol:>=3 -0.084 -0.078 -0.090 -0.211*** -0.262*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.018) (0.015) 
 d_singviol -0.190*** -0.139** -0.144** 0.095** 0.077* 
  (0.054) (0.061) (0.062) (0.039) (0.039) 
 insp: 2-3 0.096** 0.079 0.076 0.197*** 0.124*** 
  (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.027) (0.030) 
 insp: 4-9 0.133*** 0.111* 0.086 0.184*** 0.132*** 
  (0.049) (0.060) (0.059) (0.028) (0.033) 
 insp:>=10 -0.024 -0.024 -0.005 0.151*** 0.096 
  (0.067) (0.086) (0.079) (0.050) (0.063) 
 EA:1 0.060 0.077 0.058 0.116*** 0.171*** 
  (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.029) (0.030) 
 EA:>=2 -0.045 0.006 -0.033 -0.132*** -0.028 
  (0.055) (0.061) (0.057) (0.024) (0.031) 
 d_pen -0.308** -0.325*** -0.342*** -0.257*** -0.181* 
  (0.128) (0.107) (0.095) (0.073) (0.109) 
 penalty amount, log 0.043 0.049 0.054 0.047*** 0.028* 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.016) (0.017) 
 DO level <=5    0.021 0.007 
     (0.026) (0.027) 
 DO level >5    0.015*** -0.016*** 
     (0.004) (0.006) 
 dummy for multi-plant firms    0.074*** 0.075*** 
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     (0.015) (0.017) 
 Observations 840 840 840 179 179 
 log likelihood -865.7 -833.3 -846.8 -180.5 -172.7 
 χ² 34.54 99.35 72.50 16.84 32.50 
 p> χ² 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.328 0.589 
 Pseudo R2 0.020 0.056 0.041 0.045 0.086 
 president FE  yes yes  yes 
 state FE  yes   yes 
 watershed FE   yes   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is permit level change. 
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Table 3-4. Number of chemical plants with and without a nearby monitoring station, 
categorized by states 
 




   AL 12 4 
AR 1 1 
CA 1 0 
CT 0 4 
DE 4 1 
FL 3 0 
GA 4 1 
IA  1 2 
IL  2 11 
IN 1 5 
KY 6 5 
LA 54 1 
MD 2 0 
MI 1 1 
MO 1 3 
MS 0 4 
NC 14 0 
NE 1 0 
NJ 11 0 
NY 9 3 
OH 10 0 
OK 0 1 
PA 6 1 
PR 0 4 
RI 0 2 
SC 19 0 
TN 2 5 
TX 42 20 
VA 1 7 
WA 1 0 
WV 16 0 





Figure 3-2. Number of NPDES permits matched vs. unmatched with water quality data 
 
Table 3-5. Summary statistics for the sub-samples with and without water quality data 
 
Variable 
Mean of subsample 1 
(n=664) 
Mean of subsample 2 
(n=176) 
p-value for  
H0: diff = 0 
numviol:1 0.068 0.095 0.265 
numviol:2 0.021 0.067 0.020 
numviol:>=3 0.029 0.067 0.055 
d_absent 0.124 0.112 0.647 
d_singviol 0.050 0.061 0.563 
insp: 2-3 0.392 0.564 0.000 
insp: 4-9 0.375 0.335 0.319 
insp:>=10 0.077 0.028 0.002 
EA:1 0.130 0.089 0.105 
EA:>=2 0.086 0.067 0.377 
d_pen 0.079 0.101 0.379 
ln_penalty 0.756 0.897 0.538 
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3.5.1. Summary and main contributions  
This chapter explores determinants of NPDES permit setting in the context of US 
chemical manufacturing industry. I argue that the regulatory standards are determined 
by regulators’ perception of plants’ abatement effort and technology inferred from 
past performance. Using data on permitting, enforcement and compliance of the 
chemical industry from 1990 to 2010, I model and estimate the change in limit level 
as a function of plants past performance and regulatory ctivities received. Estimation 
results support the hypothesis that the regulators use plants’ past performance to 
obtain information on abatement effort and technology when making regulatory 
decisions. More specifically, I find that self-disclosed violations are regarded as a 
signal for cooperation (adequate abatement effort under technology constraint) and 
will be rewarded with relaxed future permit. Inspection is an information-gathering 
process and provides information not otherwise avail ble for the permitting decision. 
Inadequate abatement effort detected during inspections (e.g. improper operation and 
maintenance) will lead to more stringent future limit as it is technically feasible. The 
regulators are hesitant about their decisions in the case of violations due to the 
combination of inadequate effort and insufficient technology (e.g. violations that lead 
to high penalties). In addition, the permitting decision will also depend on regulator’s 
ability to use enforcement tools. As tighter permits can be used as an additional tool 
to encourage higher abatement effort, the regulators are less likely to change the limit 
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if they are capable of using the usual enforcement tools like penalties without 
constraint.  I have also found supporting evidence that the permitting authorities do 
respond to local water quality. These results, however, should be explained with 
caution as data on water quality are limited. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on environmental regulatory standard setting 
by providing the first empirical evidence on factors that affect standard setting 
decisions – the tradeoff between technology constrai t and pollution control effort – 
in the context of water pollution regulation. Setting and enforcing performance 
standards are an integral strategy from the regulator’s point of view. Findings from 
this chapter confirm that regulators adjust not only enforcement strategy but also 
performance standards in response to facilities’ compliance history. This implies for 
the plants that maintaining a good environmental performance may have the 
additional benefit of relaxed permit in addition to reduced scrutiny as found in 
previous studies.  Finally, as compliance status is defined as actual performance 
relative to the standard, this chapter also contributes to the understanding of 
enforcement and compliance by internalizing the decision making on standard setting.  
3.5.2. Future research  
This study can be extended in a number of ways. Firt of all, this chapter examines 
the relationship between permit setting and compliance history only for the chemical 
manufacturing industry and only for one pollutant. It is interesting to explore whether 
similar relationship holds for a broader set of industries and other pollutants. In 
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addition, a natural follow-up question to ask is whether the regulators make 
permitting and inspection decisions simultaneously or sequentially. A structural 
equation estimation of permit setting, inspection and enforcement actions can be used 
to examine the joint decision of standard setting ad enforcement strategies. The 
results of this study suggest regulators will tighten he NPDES permit to prompt a 
higher level of abatement effort if inadequate effort is observed. Following the result, 
it will be interesting to test whether a tightening up of the permit will indeed have the 
desired effect and lead to greater abatement effort by the regulated plants. Finally, it 
is also worth exploring how to strategically use a combination of permitting and 
enforcement to provide an incentive for adoption of cleaner technology in addition to 
higher abatement effort. Better technology would reax the current technology 
constraint and lead to more efficient pollution reduction. 
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Chapter 4: Concluding remarks 
The implementation of environmental regulations has led to substantial improvement 
of environmental quality in the nation for the past few decades. Affected businesses 
and political groups, on the other hand, argue that these regulations impose significant 
costs and lead to loss of productivity and competitiv ness. The heated debate on 
environmental regulations has focused on tradeoff between protecting the 
environment and reducing the regulatory burdens for the regulated firms and 
industries. However, it is not possible to reach a consensus or even a common ground 
for discussion without defining a proper measure fo such regulatory burden and 
quantifying the economic impact of regulations. Regulators face the tradeoff between 
environmental quality and cost/technology feasibility when determining an exact 
level of regulatory stringency. It is crucial to understand the factors regulators take 
into account when facing these tradeoffs and making regulation decisions. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to this debate by defining a more accurate measure of 
regulatory stringency, quantifying the competitiveness impact of environmental 
regulations, and exploring factors affecting regulatory decision making.  
In the first part of Chapter 2, I examine whether PAC provides a good measure of 
regulatory burdens on affected industries. I construct a heterogeneous firm model to 
show that regulation-induced changes in industry-level abatement costs contain both 
an intensive margin and an extensive margin. I apply decomposition analysis to 
identify the magnitude of the intensive margin and extensive margin effects. Results 
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from the analysis confirm that the intensive margin more accurately represents the 
direction and magnitude of regulation changes, while overall abatement cost change 
tends to underestimate changes in regulatory stringency. 
Beyond the issue of measurement, I quantify the competitiveness impacts of 
environmental regulations in the second part of Chapter 2.  The impact of regulation 
on trade flows is likely to be overestimated if theundervalued regulation change is 
used as the explanatory variable in testing PHE. To address this issue, I use the 
intensive and extensive margins as separate explanatory variables to explain changes 
in the US net imports from Canada, Mexico and the rest of the world. Results from 
fixed effects estimations suggest that abatement cost changes on the intensive margin 
and the extensive margin may lead to different or even opposite of PHE. The PHE led 
by intensive margins is much smaller than previously e timated, which suggests that 
the overestimation is corrected by using the intensive margin as a measure of 
regulation. 
Do regulators take into account cost and technology feasibility at all when trying to 
protect the local environment? In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I explore regulatory 
decision making in the context of the NPDES permit program of the water pollution 
regulation. The NPDES program requires both a technology-based and a water 
quality-based effluent limitation in order to protect local water quality. Results from 
empirical analyses confirm that regulators use facility’s compliance history to infer 
their technology capacity and abatement effort. More specifically, I find that 
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abatement effort under technology constraint as reflected by self-disclosure behavior 
is regarded as a cooperating behavior and will be rewa ded by relaxed limit levels in 
the future. On the other hand, inadequate pollution control effort such as improper 
operation and maintenance will result in more stringent future NPDES permit. 
Estimation results in this dissertation also support the hypothesis that permitting 
authorities in the US do respond to water quality when making permitting decisions.  
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the economic impacts of 
environmental regulations in the following ways. First of all, I identify a more 
accurate measure for changes in regulatory stringency that is derived from facilities’ 
PAC. This measure controls for industry composition change caused by firm-
heterogeneity in technology and differentiated respon e to regulation. A proper 
measure of regulatory stringency forms the basis for evaluating any economic impact 
of regulations on the affected industries. Secondly, I correct the overestimation of 
PHE in previous studies by using the more accurate measure of regulation change. 
Environmental regulations do harm manufacturing industries’ competitiveness to the 
extent that tighter regulations will lead to increas d net imports, but the negative 
impact is not as bad as previously thought if we tak  into account the changes in 
market structure. Finally, this dissertation is the first to systematically study the 
effects of regulation on trade flows while controlling for changes in industry 
structure. By using the intensive margin and composition change as separate 
explanatory variables to explain trade flows, I differentiate the impacts of regulation 
caused by increasing regulatory burden on a fixed set of firms/industries from those 
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caused by change in composition. 
By studying the NPDES permit program, this dissertation contributes to the literature 
on environmental regulatory decision making. Previous studies on environmental 
regulations have focused on the determinants of inspections and enforcement 
activities. To the best of my knowledge, this study provides the first empirical 
evidence of factors affecting regulatory standard setting in the context of water 
pollution regulations. Results from econometric analyses suggest that regulators aim 
to protect water quality by inducing higher abatement effort within technology 
constraint, on which the information is inferred from facilities’ compliance behavior. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation implies that the tradeoff between the level of 
environmental protection effort and technology feasibility is the main consideration 
for determining the stringency of water regulation. Finally, setting and enforcing 
performance standards are an integral strategy from the regulator’s point of view. 
Findings from Chapter 3 confirm that regulators adjust not only enforcement strategy 





Appendix A. Derivation of the intensive and extensive margins 
The industry level PAC intensity can be written as  
E = F GHI	&J<F KHLLJ< & =
F ! 1 −  &J<F  − !	J< & =
nL																										H − 1 
The impact of an environmental tax change is 
&E& = &n& 1L − nL$ &L& 																																																																									H − 2 
where  
&n& = 4 &GHIh& &
J
<
− GHIh|)< &.& = 3 − I3 &.& 																	 H − 3				 
&L& = 4 & − !
 11 − & &
J
<
−  − ! 1 −  C)< &.&
= $ − I$ &.& 																																																															H − 4				 
Equations (A-3) and (A-4) are obtained using the Leibniz integral rule and assuming 
that / does not change with respect to regulation. Note that the terms 
3, $, I3, I$, L are functions of model parameters, , !; / , ., where .is the 
before change cutoff value. However, the second terms of (A-3) and (A-4) depend on 
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how the cutoff value will change in response to the c anges in regulation. Now plug 
&n &⁄  and &L &⁄  back into &E &⁄ , and we have 
&E& = &n& 1L − nL$ &L& = 3L − n$L$  − I3L + nI$L$  &.&
= OP, , !; / , . − O3, , !; / , . &.& 											H − 5 
where the first part is the aggregate cost change for a ixed set firms as if the cutoff 
values remained the same, and the second part denotes abatement cost change that 
depends on firm dynamics and the change of the cutoff abatement productivity. 
Appendix B. Discussion of the PACE survey  
As described in Section 2.4.1, the PACE survey colle ts data on costs related to 
pollution treatment, prevention and other activities from manufacturing facilities. It 
thus provides the single most comprehensive source of abatement costs and 
expenditures (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). This information on compliance cost 
is crucial for the purpose of examining the economic i pact of environmental 
regulations. Therefore data from the PACE survey have been widely used by 
economists in analyzing firms’ response to regulations (decisions on location and 
size) as well as the impact of regulations on investm nt, employment and productivity 
at industry level. 
Overtime, however, the researchers using the PACE data have identified several 
issues of the PACE survey related to whether it accurately collects and measures 
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pollution-related expenditures. Main issues include, firstly, that not all pollution 
related costs are captured by the PACE survey and the ata may under-estimate true 
compliance cost (Morgenstern et al., 1998). Expenditures spent on changes in 
production process or input substitution may serve the dual purposes of abatement 
and profit-generating, and it is difficult for the facility accountant/manager to record 
this cost as abatement cost. In addition, additional constraint imposed by 
environmental regulation may reduce productivity of other (non-abatement) inputs or 
overall productivity  (Gray & Shadbegian, 2002; Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, 1990;  
Levinson, 1996) . However, when firm heterogeneity is accounted for using fixed 
effects estimations, the magnitude of underestimation becomes negligible or even to 
the opposite. This is because the unobserved firm heterogeneity in productivity will 
generate different estimates of costs (Morgenstern et al., 1998). Secondly, facilities 
lack appropriate baseline against which to compare cost (Berman & Bui, 2001; Jaffe 
et al., 1995; A. Levinson, 1996). The accurate costdata should compare the actual 
scenario with the counterfactual by measuring the costs above and beyond the amount 
a plant would have spent in the absence of pollution control effort. The PACE reports 
mentioned in their introduction section that telephone conversations and interviews 
with survey respondents indicate that in many instances estimating the baseline and 
the incremental costs related to pollution control is very difficult.  
I use only operating costs in this study because the above mentioned concerns are 
more severe for capital expenditures. The PACE survey eports the baseline issue as a 
major limitation of the data and therefore warns users to explain the CIPP data with 
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caution (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). In addition, capital expenditures are for 
new investment during the survey year instead of annu lized costs (Levinson & 
Taylor, 2008). Focusing on a single year’s capital expenditure can be problematic as 
it only reflects one-time purchasing expenditures and installation costs. However, the 
effects of environmental regulations usually last several years after they are first 
enacted. Therefore the capital expenditures occurred for the purpose of complying 
with regulations should be allocated over the years instead of counting them as a one-
time cost. Lastly, there are considerable missing values for capital expenditures in the 
published survey results at the 4-digit SIC industry level. A major part of these 
missing values are withheld to avoid disclosing operations of individual companies. 
Considerable information is lost due to the missing values, which makes comparisons 
over time less robust. Therefore, I use only operating costs for which the missing data 
issue is much less severe. 
Appendix C. Dealing with missing values in PAOC data  
Missing values in the pollution abatement cost measures pose a major challenge for 
the decomposition analyses. We need a balanced panel in order to obtain consistent 
output shares and abatement cost intensities to calculate the differences. To deal with 
the missing values, I proceed in the following 2 step . 
I have a total of 17 years of data (1977 to 1994, except 1987) for the pollution 
abatement costs. I first dropped any 4-digit industry that has missing PAOC data for 9 
or more years. By doing so, I dropped about 20% of the total data (1496 out of 7616). 
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Any industry with missing PAOC less than 8 year will remain in the data (80.36%), 
where the missing data will be interpolated. Next I dropped two 2-digit SIC sectors, 
Leather and leather products (31) and Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
(SIC39), because the majority of them are missing values. In other words, the 4-digit 
industries within these 2 sectors have very limited data in the PACE survey. The 
second step is to interpolate the missing values of PAOC. The basic idea is to assign 
those 4-digit industries the average abatement cost intensity of an average industry 
within the same 3-digit or 2-digit sector. Now there are a total of 5831 observations in 
the dataset, but only 4873 of them have the abatement cost measure, with 958 missing 
values. I calculate the average abatement cost intensity (PAC/value added) at 3-digit 
and 2-digit SIC levels, where the PAOC data are not missing at these higher levels of 
aggregation. Any missing 4-digit SIC abatement costdata is first replaced by the 4-
digit value added multiplied by the 3-digit average cost intensity. Any remaining 
missing values are further replaced by multiplying the 2-digit average cost intensity. 
At the end, 956 of the 958 missing 4-digit PAOC observations are interpolated. The 
remaining 2 missing values are because the PAOC data is missing at even 2-digit 
level (SIC21, tobacco products in 1981). These interpolated PAOC data are used in 
the decomposition analyses in Section 2.4 and PHE estimation in Section 2.5. The 
original and the interpolated PAC data are not statistically different according to 
classical t test. Finally, I restrict the sample period from 1977 to 1986 for the reasons 
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